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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I examine the effect of statutory regimes on two common decisions made by
market agents that are characterized by information asymmetries. For each decision, specifically, the
decision to engage in accounting fraud by firm managers and the choice of contract to offer legal
representation, a theoretical model is used to offer predictions which are then tested using laboratory
experiments.

Chapter I examines the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley provisions pertaining to whistle-blower
protections and reporting requirements on a managerial team’s incentive to commit accounting fraud.
Analysis predicts that whistle-blowing does not occur in equilibrium, but that the whistle-blower
protections combined with the reporting requirements can reduce fraud, and are most likely to do so
when managers are heterogeneous in their aversion to sanctions. Interestingly, amnesty provisions have
no effect on the equilibrium level of fraud. In line with previous literature, equity compensation induces
managerial effort, but also provides the incentive for management to fraudulently misreport the
financial health of the firm.

Chapter II discusses the results of an experimental test of the theory and finds that whistleblowing does occur in part due to coordination failures among members of the team. The out-ofequilibrium behavior from which whistle-blowing results renders the theoretical prediction that amnesty
does not matter to be moot, and analysis shows that whistle-blowing decreases the amount of fraud
that goes undetected by authorities, and that this effect is magnified by amnesty provisions. Otherwise,
the experiments yield strong support for the theoretical predictions of the model.

Chapter III uses a theoretical model and experimental test to consider the possibility that
contingent fees may improve the quality of legal services by allowing clients to screen low-quality
v

attorneys. The model suggests that caps on contingent fees may reduce the average quality of legal
representation by allowing low-quality attorneys to remain in the market and decrease client welfare by
allowing attorneys to earn rents. Experimental evidence provides support for these predictions, showing
that client welfare and screening decrease as caps become more stringent, even if the caps are not do
not prevent screening.
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CHAPTER I: MANAGERIAL TEAMS, WHISTLE-BLOWING, AND FRAUD

Introduction

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s corporations embraced the recommendations of agency
theory by utilizing equity compensation to incentivize managers (Murphy 1999). However, the recent
high-profile exposure of illegal accounting practices in numerous corporations, such as Enron and
Worldcom, has led both researchers and policy-makers to acknowledge that fraud may be an
unexpected consequence of these compensation schemes. It is now understood that at least one major
roadblock to the practical application of agency theory to the corporate setting is that managers may
manipulate a firm’s stock price by misreporting the financial health of the firm. As explained by the
AICPA, “Management may override controls to intentionally misstate the nature and timing of revenue
or other transactions by (1) recording fictitious business events or transactions or changing the timing of
legitimate transactions, particularly those recorded close to the end of an accounting period; (2)
establishing or reversing reserves to manipulate results, including intentionally biasing assumptions and
judgment used to estimate account balances; and (3) altering records and terms related to significant or
unusual transactions.” (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 2005)

In response to recent accounting scandals, lawmakers passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
The Act attempts to reduce fraud by strengthening corporate governance and reporting requirements,
and our analysis focuses on two of Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions. The first is the protection from
retaliation given to whistle-blowing employees.1,2 As discussed by Watnick (2006), “In attempting to

1

18 U.S.C. 1514A, “Civil action to protect against retaliation in fraud cases.”; 18 U.S.C. 1513 (e), “Retaliating against
a witness, victim, or an informant.”

1

reform American business practices, Congress impressed into service corporate officers, directors, and
other corporate employees, enlisting them as ‘foot soldiers’ in the fight against corporate fraud.
Congress did so by requiring those who witness corporate fraud to report what they know about it and
by offering commiserate protection from retaliation under the ‘whistle-blower protection’ provisions
contained within Sarbanes-Oxley.”

The second provision of interest is the requirement that management establish and affirm the
adequacy of their financial reports.3 Specifically, “the principal executive officer or officers and the
principal financial officer or officers, or persons performing similar functions”4 must certify that they are
“responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls”5 and “have designed such internal
controls to ensure that material information relating to the company and its consolidated subsidiaries is
made known to such officers by others within those entities.”6 Management must ensure, with threat
of criminal penalties for noncompliance, that “information contained in the periodic report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer.”7

In this paper, we consider the implications of supporting whistle-blowers (through employee
protections) and requiring complicity in misreporting (through having managers sign off on financial
reports) on the incentives of a managerial team to commit fraud. We construct and draw implications
from a model in which a team of managers receives equity compensation to run a firm.8 The team

2

See Watnick (2006) for a comprehensive review of the statutory language, legislative history, and regulations
pursuant to the Act, as well as analysis of the effectiveness of the provisions and legal cases relating to the whistleblower provisions.
3
15 U.S.C. 7262, “Management assessment of internal controls.”
4
15 U.S.C. 7241, “Corporate responsibility for financial reports.”
5
Ibid
6
Ibid
7
18 U.S.C. 1350, “Failure of corporate officers to certify financial reports.”
8
We use the same definition of team as found in Holmstrom (1982), namely, “A group of individuals who are
organized so that their productive inputs are related.”

2

provides productive effort, which increases the true value of the firm, and also reports the value to the
market. The reported value, however, may be fraudulently inflated by one or more managers. It is
assumed that all managers know whether fraud has taken place, and thus each manager is able to blow
the whistle prior to sending the report to the market. Managers differ in their sensitivity to sanctions,
implying that some managers are more inclined to report fraud than others. A manager who blows the
whistle may be given complete or partial amnesty for his or her individual contribution. If no manager
reports the fraud, there is a chance that the fraud will later be detected by authorities, in which case
every manager is treated as being complicit and receives an identical sanction.

We find that, in equilibrium, only a fraction of the (heterogeneous) managers actively
participate in the fraud, yet no manager blows the whistle. This is true despite the fact that the entire
team faces a positive probability of sanction. The reason that no manager blows the whistle is that
every member of the team holds stock in the firm and thus benefits if the fraud goes undetected. At the
same time, those managers who actively commit fraud refrain from over-reporting at a level that would
cause whistle-blowing by the managers who do not actively participate in the illegal behavior. As a
result, rules that protect whistle-blowing and that effectively mandate complicity among the managerial
team (by having management sign off on reports created by others) do keep fraud in check, but do not
eradicate it entirely.

Our analysis also helps shed light on the notable absence of amnesty provisions for whistleblowers in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or, more generally, federal sentencing guidelines. Surprisingly,
amnesty provisions are found to have no effect on the magnitude of fraud because those who are most
inclined to blow the whistle do not actively participate in illegal over-reporting. These potential whistleblowers would not receive sanctions even if they were to report the fraud.
3

Theoretical research exploring the effects of equity compensation on accounting fraud has
mostly focused on single-agent models. Goldman and Slezak (2006) find that an increase in managerial
equity compensation leads to greater incentives to commit fraud, while an increase in the probability of
detection has an ambiguous effect because the owner may respond by increasing the pay-forperformance sensitivity. Andergassen (2008) examines whether stock-based or stock option-based
compensation is optimal when managers may fraudulently inflate the value of the firm. Crocker and
Slemrod (2007) derive the optimal compensation contract in a setting where the manager can generate
an inflated earnings report. They show that a contract contingent on reported earnings cannot provide a
manager with the incentive to both maximize profits and honestly report earnings. Bar-Gill and Bebchuk
(2003) use a dynamic model that allows for both legal and illegal manipulation of the stock price. These
authors find that increases in exercisable equity compensation lead to greater incentives to engage in
fraudulent behavior, and that tightening controls on the ability of managers to liquidate decreases the
incentive to commit fraud. Finally, Robison and Santore (2008) study an owner’s incentive to invest in
both ex ante monitoring, which decreases the likelihood that fraud is possible, and ex post monitoring,
which increases the probability that fraud will be detected after the fact.

While the papers discussed above consider managerial fraud and allow for the possibility of
detection, they do not allow for the possibility of whistle-blowing. Heyes and Kapur (2008) and Friebel
and Guriev (2005) are two recent papers that formally model the decision to blow the whistle. Heyes
and Kapur (2008) develop a model of whistle-blowing behavior in which agents may report
environmental violations, although their results can be applied to other contexts. Unlike our model, in
which whistle-blowers act to avoid being punished for the managerial team’s actions, their model
focuses on various motivations for whistle-blowers to act to prevent harm to others. These authors find

4

that the optimal enforcement policy is dictated in large part by the motivation of the potential whistleblower.

Friebel and Guriev (2005) assume that upper management receives equity compensation and
can artificially inflate earnings. In order to prevent lower management from blowing the whistle, upper
management must give lower management additional compensation. Despite some similarities, their
paper differs from ours in a few important aspects. First, our managers hold identical positions within
the managerial team and each is able to actively participate in the fraud, while Friebel and Guriev have
two levels of manager and only top management can actively commit fraud. Second, unlike Friebel and
Guriev, we do not allow the team to manipulate the compensation packages in order to prevent whistleblowing. Third, whistle-blowing in our model is motivated by the potential for team punishment when
fraud is detected, which can occur even if no manager blows the whistle. In contrast, Friebel and Guriev
assume that fraud is detected only if lower management blows the whistle.

There has also been a sizable array of empirical research on the impact of executive
compensation on accounting malfeasance. Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (Forthcoming) compare a sample of
firms under suspicion by the SEC of engaging in fraudulent behavior with a control sample of “innocent”
firms. They find that the likelihood of fraud is correlated with unrestricted stockholdings and that
unrestricted stockholdings comprise the largest share of managerial incentives at firms guilty of fraud.
Peng and Roell (2006) find greater pay in the form of stock options increases the probability that a firm
will be involved in securities litigation. Burns and Kedia (2006) use a sample of firms that restated
earnings between 1995 and 2001 to look at the relationship between CEO compensation and
misreporting, and they find that there is a significant and positive relationship between the sensitivity of
a CEO’s compensation package to a change in the stock price and the propensity to misreport earnings.
5

They also find that the magnitude of misreporting is larger in firms offering more equity-based
compensation, and that options provide the strongest incentive to misreport because the risk of
detection is lower than with other forms of compensation. In addition to the above field studies, Bruner,
McKee, and Santore (2008) find experimental evidence that the amount of effort exerted and fraud
committed are positively correlated with the level of equity compensation. 9

The Model
A team of 𝑁 risk-neutral managers is hired to provide effort to increase the value of the firm.
The size of the team depends on the specifics of the firm and is taken as exogenous. The team is
compensated with both salary and equity. The managers are assumed identical so each receives the
same contract. Let 𝑠 represent the total salary and 𝛼 represent the total share of equity paid to the
team. It follows that the salary and share of equity given to each manager are

𝑠
𝑁

and

𝛼
𝑁

, respectively.

As we do not focus on the owner’s problem or the optimal contract, we assume for simplicity that the
contract exceeds the reservation utility of each manager in the team.
Each manager chooses an unobservable level of effort, 𝑒𝑖 , which costs 𝐶 𝑒𝑖 . The true value of
the firm is determined by the combined effort of all managers, 𝐸 =

𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑒𝑖 ,

and a stochastic

component, 𝜇, which is normally distributed with 𝐸 𝜇 = 0 and variance 𝜍 2 . Specifically, the true value

9

Other empirical research includes work by Bergstresser and Philippon (Forthcoming), who find that a greater
share of a CEO’s compensation derived from stock and option holdings is correlated with a greater propensity to
engage in earnings management. Ke (2005) also finds that managers with exercisable stock options and
unrestricted stock have a greater propensity for earnings manipulation. Cheng and Warfield (2003) find a
significant positive relationship between stock-based compensation and an abnormal tendency to meet or barely
exceed analysts’ forecasts. Richardson, Tuna, and Wu (2003) also find that executives at restating firms have more
equity-based compensation, but they do not distinguish between options and straight equity.

6

of the firm is 𝑉 𝐸, 𝜇 = 𝑣 𝐸 + 𝜇, where 𝑣 ′ 𝐸 > 0 and 𝑣 ′ ′𝐸 < 0. Once the true value of the firm is
determined, this value is learned by the managers, but no one else.

With the true value determined, the managers issue a report on the firm’s value to the market,
𝑉 𝑅 = 𝑉 𝐸, 𝜇 − 𝑠 + 𝐹, where 𝐹 is a non-negative fraudulent inflation of the true value. While the
contracts paid to the managers are observable, both 𝑉 𝐸, 𝜇 and 𝐹 are not. Each manager contributes
to this report of the firm’s value, and we will refer to each manager’s decision as a choice of fraud, 𝑓 𝑖 .
These choices are aggregated with the fraud of other managers, 𝐹−𝑖 =
𝐹=

𝑁
𝑖
𝑖=1 𝑓 .

𝑗 ≠𝑖 𝑓

𝑗

into total fraud,

One interpretation is that each manager is responsible for some section of the firm, and is

able to report inflated earnings for that section. The reports are then aggregated to yield a reported
value for the firm.

One or more managers may choose to report fraud to external authorities before the report is
issued to the market; that is, a manager may blow the whistle. If whistle-blowing occurs, the ensuing
investigation detects and prevents all fraudulent activity so that a truthful earnings report is released to
the public. Below we describe the sanctions imposed on management in the event that the fraud is
reported.
After the report is made, the managers sell their equity stakes at the market value.10
Afterwards, the true value is learned by the market with certainty, causing damage to the firm, 𝐷 𝐹 ,
commensurate with the difference between the reported value and true value. The market is assumed
to anticipate a level of fraud, 𝐹 𝑒 , and adjusts the market value of the firm accordingly. In this case, the
market value of the firm is 𝑉 𝑀 = 𝑉 𝑅 − 𝐹 𝑒 − 𝐷(𝐹 𝑒 ).
10

All managers must sell their equity stakes. If this were not the case, there would exist a classic adverse selection
problem (Akerlof 1970); the mere fact that a manager sold his or her shares would signal that that fraud had
occurred.

7

While the firm absorbs damage from the fraud with certainty, there is only a positive
probability, 𝜌, that the deviation between the reported value and true value will be determined
fraudulent.11 Let 𝑋() denote the convex sanction function that determines the punishment to the
manager if the fraud is detected or reported, where 𝑋 ′ > 0, 𝑋 ′′ > 0, and 𝑋 ′ 0 = 0. This sanction
represents seizure of pay, jail time, reputation losses, etc., examples of which can be seen in several
recent federal prosecutions.12

All managers receive disutility from being sanctioned, but some managers receive greater
disutility than others. 13, 14, 15, 16 We assume that there are two types of manager and let 𝑡 = 𝐿, 𝐻 denote
a manager’s type. A type 𝐿 manager (referred to as a low) incurs disutility 𝜂𝐿 𝑋() from being sanctioned
while a type 𝐻 manager (referred to as a high) incurs disutility 𝜂𝐻 𝑋() from being sanctioned, where 𝜂𝐻
and 𝜂𝐿 are constants and 𝜂𝐻 > 𝜂𝐿 . There are 𝑁𝐿 ≥ 1 lows and 𝑁𝐻 ≥ 1 highs in the team, so that
𝑁𝐿 + 𝑁𝐻 = 𝑁.
In the case of a managerial team, where all members are working for a single entity and can be
considered negligent if fraud occurs, team punishment is assumed. In the case where no manager blows
the whistle (discussed below), we assume that manager sanctions are based on the average level of
11

One can interpret 𝜌 as the probability that authorities have sufficient evidence to build a case against the
managerial team.
12
United States v. Kenneth L. Lay & Jeffrey K. Skilling (2004CR00025 – U.S. District Court – Southern District of
Texas), and United States v. Bernard J. Ebbers (2002CR1144 – U.S. District Court – Southern District of New York)
are examples.
13
Schmidt (2005) provides a non-technical discussion of the merits of rewarding external whistle-blowing and of
the impacts encouragement of whistle-blowing has on different types of managers.
14
For example, a young manager may suffer greater future pay losses from establishing a criminal record early in
his or her career than an older manager nearing retirement. Furthermore, as discussed by Cooter and Porat (2001),
behavior that is inconsistent with social norms can lead to nonlegal sanctions that can vary across individuals.
15
Mittendorf (2008) employs a principal-agent model where agents differ in their ethical characteristics, and finds
that the existence of ‘ethical’ agents alters the behavior of those who are not ‘ethical.’ His model focuses on
shirking by agents, and does not allow for the possibility that agents can commit fraud.
16
Differences in risk-aversion would yield similar results, as risk-aversion is a measure of the disutility of the risk.
We discuss other sources of heterogeneity later in the paper.

8

𝐹
𝑁

fraud, . 17 This is consistent with the notion that, regardless of each manager’s individual contribution
to fraud, each member of the team is complicit and should be held accountable. Hence, if the
managerial team is found to have committed fraud, the utility cost for a manager of type 𝑡 is 𝜂𝑡 𝑋

𝐹
𝑁

.

A manager who blows the whistle is held responsible for his or her individual choice of
(attempted) fraud, implying that a whistle-blower who did not attempt to commit fraud is not
sanctioned. At the same time, when one or more managers blow the whistle, the other managers are
punished based on the average level of fraud committed by those managers who did not blow the
whistle. Formally, if 𝑁𝑊 managers choose to blow the whistle and these managers were responsible for
a combined level of fraud 𝐹𝑊 , then the managers who did not blow the whistle are each held
𝐹−𝐹

responsible for 𝑁−𝑁𝑊 total fraud. Thus, a manager who does not commit fraud but also does not blow
𝑊

the whistle receives the same sanction as a manager who did commit fraud. This assumption is
consistent with the view that managers have a fiduciary responsibility to report fraud, regardless of
whether these managers actively participated in the fraud.

Consistent with statutes such as Sarbanes-Oxley, we allow for the possibility that, in exchange
for revealing fraud, managers receive some degree of immunity from prosecution in addition to the
protections from retaliation stated in the Act itself. Thus, managers are able to protect themselves from
being punished for the actions of others if they find the risk to be too great. To model this partial
immunity, we let 𝜃 represent the proportional reduction in penalty for the whistle-blower, where
0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1. To summarize, the utility cost for manager 𝑖 of type 𝑡 who blows the whistle is (1 −

17

One could punish each manager based on the entire amount of fraud with no qualitative change in results.

9

𝜃)𝜂𝑡 𝑋 𝑓𝑡𝑖 , and the utility cost for manager 𝑖 of type 𝑡 when 𝑁𝑊 another managers who committed a
total of 𝐹𝑊 of fraud blow the whistle is 𝜂𝑡 𝑋

𝐹−𝐹𝑊
𝑁−𝑁𝑊

. 18

It follows from the above discussion that the expected utility for manager 𝑖 of type 𝑡 ultimately
depends on 𝑖’s choice of effort and fraud, the effort and fraud choices of other team members, and how
many managers blow the whistle.
𝐸𝑈𝑖 =
𝑠
𝑁
𝑠
𝑁

+

+

𝛼
𝑁

𝛼

𝑉 𝐸, 𝜇 − 𝑠 − 𝐹 𝑒 − 𝐷(𝐹 𝑒 ) − 𝐶 𝑒𝑖 − (1 − 𝜃)𝜂𝑡 𝑋 𝑓𝑡𝑖 , 𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑖 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑡𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑒

𝑉 𝐸, 𝜇 − 𝑠 − 𝐹 𝑒 − 𝐷(𝐹 𝑒 ) − 𝐶 𝑒𝑖 − 𝜂𝑡 𝑋

𝑁
𝑠

𝑁

+

𝛼
𝑁

𝐹−𝐹𝑊
𝑁−𝑁𝑊

, 𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝑊 𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑡𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑒 ) (1

𝑉 𝐸, 𝜇 − 𝑠 + 𝐹 − 𝐹 𝑒 − 𝐷(𝐹 𝑒 ) − 𝐶 𝑒𝑖 − 𝜌𝜂𝑡 𝑋

𝐹
𝑁

, 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑡𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑒

Team punishment provides an incentive to monitor and report on the behavior of other
members of the team. If punishment were not applied to the entire team, a manager would never blow
the whistle in equilibrium. Indeed, not blowing the whistle and not committing fraud dominates
blowing the whistle since in the former case the manager may receive an inflated price for his or her
equity holdings and has no chance of being sanctioned. When the choice of fraud is made individually
but the entire team is punished, it is possible that total fraud could reach levels unacceptable to some
managers. Faced with this possibility, with no mitigating instrument, highs may choose not to play the
game, and an adverse selection problem would result. Here, whistle-blowing serves as a mitigating
instrument.

To summarize, the timing of events are as follows:
Stage 1: Each manager simultaneously and individually chooses a level of effort.
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The main results are robust to different specifications of penalties when another manager blows the whistle. In
particular, Lemma 1 continues to hold for a wide variety of circumstances since we cannot have an equilibrium in
which fraud is committed and some manager blows the whistle.
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Stage 2: The true value of the firm, 𝑉 𝐸, 𝜇 − 𝑠, is realized and observed by all managers.
Stage 3: Each manager simultaneously and individually chooses a level of fraud.
Stage 4: Each manager observes the fraud chosen by the other managers and decides whether or not to
engage in “whistle-blowing”, revealing to authorities that fraud is about to occur.
Stage 5: Each manager sells his or her equity stake in the firm, regardless of whether or not whistleblowing has occurred.
Stage 6: There is a positive probability, 𝜌, that any difference in reported and true values is determined
to be fraudulent, in which case all managers are punished based on the total amount of fraud. (Note: If
whistle-blowing has occurred then the reported value equals the true value, so no sanctions are
applied.) Regardless of whether or not the difference between the reported and true value is proven
fraudulent, the value of the firm is reduced by 𝐷 𝐹 .

Results
In our analysis, we focus on a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in which all managers of the
same type choose the same level of fraud. There is a multiplicity of equilibria, but the total amount of
fraud is the same in each, so restricting our discussion to the symmetric equilibrium does not alter the
qualitative nature of our results.

We begin by solving the game backwards and determining when it is optimal for a manager to
blow the whistle. If a manager blows the whistle, he or she sells the stock at the true value and faces a
possibly-reduced sanction for the fraud he or she committed. If a manager does not blow the whistle, he
or she benefits from selling the stock at the artificially inflated price, but has a positive probability of
facing a sanction based on the average amount of fraud. Comparing the payoffs given in equation 1, we
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find that it is optimal for a manager of type 𝑡 ∈ 𝐿(𝑙𝑜𝑤), 𝐻(𝑖𝑔) to blow the whistle if, for a given level
of total fraud, the following is satisfied for any manager in Stage 4:
𝛼
𝐹
𝐹 − 𝜌𝜂𝑡 𝑋
≤ −𝜂𝑡 (1 − 𝜃)𝑋 𝑓𝑡𝑖 ,
𝑁
𝑁

𝑡 = 𝐿, 𝐻

(2)

If (2) holds with equality, the manager is indifferent between blowing the whistle and not. In such
circumstances, we assume that the manager does not blow the whistle.

Lemma 1: Whistle-blowing does not occur in equilibrium.19

If the total level of fraud is such that it is optimal for a manager to blow the whistle, any
manager who committed positive fraud receives negative net benefits. Thus, it can never be an
equilibrium for managers to commit fraud if doing so will cause some manager to blow the whistle.
Nevertheless, as shown below, the mere threat that another member of the team will go to authorities
may be sufficient to reduce the total level of fraud.

Given that we can rule out any equilibrium in which whistle-blowing occurs, the next step is to
determine the equilibrium level of fraud. Although the fear that someone may blow the whistle can
affect the equilibrium, it is convenient to first determine the preferred level of fraud assuming whistleblowing were not possible. Highs and lows have different preferred levels of total fraud, which are the
solutions to the following maximization problem.
max 𝐸𝑈𝑖 =
𝐹

𝑠 𝛼
+
𝑣 𝐸 − 𝑠 + 𝐹 − 𝐹𝑒 − 𝐷 𝐹𝑒
𝑁 𝑁

− 𝐶 𝑒𝑖 − 𝜌𝜂𝑡 𝑋

The first order condition for an interior solution is:
19

Proofs for all lemmas and propositions are located in Appendix A.
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𝐹
,
𝑁

𝑡 = 𝐿, 𝐻

𝛼 𝜌𝜂𝑡 ′ 𝐹
−
𝑋
= 0, 𝑡 = 𝐿, 𝐻
𝑁
𝑁
𝑁

(3)

The assumption that 𝑋 ′ 0 = 0 rules out a corner solution. The second-order condition for maximization
is also satisfied:
−

𝜌𝜂𝑡 ′′ 𝐹
𝑋
< 0, 𝑡 = 𝐿, 𝐻
𝑁2
𝑁

4

Let 𝑃𝑡 > 0 be implicitly defined by (3), where the arguments are suppressed. This value represents the
preferred level of total fraud for a manager of type t, assuming that whistle-blowing does not occur. This
preferred level is that which maximizes the expected net benefits from fraud, which we define as the
expected utility derived from fraud a manager receives given that, as Lemma 1 indicates, whistleblowing does not occur. With the preferred level of fraud determined for each type, we now determine
the level of fraud which will cause whistle-blowing for a given manager.

As shown, in equilibrium no manager will blow the whistle, yet the threat of whistle-blowing
may alter the equilibrium level of fraud. The level of fraud that will be tolerated by manager 𝑖 depends
on the manager’s type and the level of fraud that he or she has chosen. Define 𝑊 𝑡 (𝑓𝑡𝑖 ) as the maximum
total amount of fraud that does not cause manager 𝑖 of type 𝑡 to blow the whistle when 𝑖 has chosen 𝑓𝑡𝑖 .
From (2), 𝑊 𝑡 (𝑓𝑡𝑖 ) is the non-zero amount of fraud, 𝐹, that solves:
𝛼
𝐹
𝐹 − 𝜌𝜂𝑡 𝑋
+ 𝜂𝑡 1 − 𝜃 𝑋 𝑓𝑡𝑖 = 0,
𝑁
𝑁

𝑡 = 𝐿, 𝐻

(5)

Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the preferred and whistle-blowing levels of fraud.
The preferred level of fraud, 𝑃𝑡 , maximizes the increase in the value of a manager’s equity due
𝛼

to the fraud, 𝑁 𝐹, less the expected sanctions, 𝜌𝜂𝑡 𝑋

𝐹
𝑁

. Because punishment is levied against the entire

team if no manager blows the whistle, the preferred level of fraud is unaffected by an individual
manager’s contribution to that fraud. The whistle-blowing level of fraud, 𝑊 𝑡 𝑓𝑡𝑖 , is the non-zero level
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of fraud at which a manager is indifferent about blowing the whistle (i.e. when the expected net
benefits if whistle-blowing does not occur are equal to the benefit of blowing the whistle). If a manager
is responsible for some of the fraud (𝑓𝑡𝑖 > 0), as in Figure 1, then indifference occurs at negative
expected benefits as described by (5), because the manager will be punished for his or her individual
contribution if whistle-blowing occurs. As should be clear from Figure 1, it is straightforward to show
that 𝑊 𝑡 (𝑓𝑡𝑖 ) is increasing in 𝑓𝑡𝑖 . If 𝑓𝑡𝑖 = 0, then indifference occurs at the horizontal axis. Similarly, if full
amnesty is granted to whistle-blowers, 𝜃 = 1, indifference occurs at the horizontal axis.

Lemma 2: The preferred level of fraud for a given type of manager is less than the level that causes
whistle-blowing, regardless of the manager’s individual contribution to total fraud. Formally, 𝑃𝑡 <
𝑊 𝑡 (𝑓𝑡𝑖 ) for all 𝑓𝑡𝑖 ≥ 0.
Whistle-blowing occurs when there is too much fraud for a manager to accept the risk of
external punishment, so it is not surprising that this amount must be larger than the preferred level.
Lemma 3: Highs prefer less fraud than lows. Formally, 𝑃𝐻 < 𝑃𝐿 .

The above lemma states the intuitive result that those managers with a higher sensitivity to
sanction prefer less fraud than managers with a lower sensitivity. This follows from the fact that both
types receive the same benefit from any given level of fraud, but highs receive greater punishment, if
detected, than the lows.
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Figure 1: Preferred and whistle-blowing levels of fraud
The preferred and whistle-blowing levels of fraud for a manager who commits a positive level of fraud
and where full-amnesty from punishment is not granted. (i.e. 𝒇𝒊𝒕 > 0, 𝜽 < 1)
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Lemma 4: If the equilibrium level of fraud exceeds the preferred level of some type t, then all managers
of type t must commit zero fraud. Formally, if 𝐹 ∗ > 𝑃𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡 = 𝐿, 𝐻, 𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑓𝑡∗ = 0.

If the equilibrium level of fraud is higher than the preferred level for that type, a manager of
that type would be better off decreasing his or her individual contribution to the fraud. Therefore, the
equilibrium level of fraud cannot exceed the preferred level of that type unless managers of that type
commit no fraud. We can now characterize the equilibrium.

Proposition 1: At a subgame-perfect symmetric equilibrium
(i)

total fraud equals 𝐹 ∗ = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝐿 , 𝑊 𝐻 (0) ;

(ii)

the highs commit no fraud, 𝑓𝐻∗ = 0 ;

(iii)

the lows commit a positive level of fraud, 𝑓𝐿∗ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛

(iv)

no manager blows the whistle.

𝑃 𝐿 𝑊 𝐻 (0)
, 𝑁
𝑁𝐿
𝐿

; and

At equilibrium, the lows commit either their preferred level of fraud or the greatest amount that
does not trigger a high to report the illegal activity. The highs commit no fraud, but do not blow the
whistle, implying that they are no worse off than if fraud were impossible. Important to note is that the
composition of the team does not matter, as long as there is at least one of each type. The equilibrium is
determined by the preferred level of fraud for the low type and the whistle-blowing level of the high
type, not the proportion of each type in the team. Figures 2 and 3 provide a graphical illustration for
each of the two cases where the respective values of 𝑊 𝐻 (0) and 𝑃𝐿 differ.
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Figure 2: Expected benefit of fraud when types are different.
The expected benefit of fraud to each type of manager when the managers are “sufficiently different.”
(i.e. 𝑊 𝐻 (0) < 𝑃𝐿 )
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Figure 3: Expected benefit of fraud when managers are similar.
The expected benefit of fraud to each type of manager when the managers are “sufficiently similar.” (i.e.
𝑾𝑯 (𝟎) > 𝑷𝑳 )
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When the whistle-blowing condition for the high is less than the preferred level for the low, given
that the high commits no fraud (Lemma 4), then the only choices of fraud acceptable to both types is
the range given by 𝑃𝐻 to 𝑊 𝐻 (0). Lows push the level of fraud as high as possible without inducing the
highs to blow the whistle.

In Figure 3, the preferred level of fraud for the low is below the whistle-blowing condition for
the high, so the equilibrium level of fraud is the one that is preferred by the lows. Both types benefit
from the fraud, although the highs do not contribute to it.

Proposition 2: The relative magnitudes of 𝜂𝐿 and 𝜂𝐻 determine the nature of the equilibrium.
(i)

If the two types are sufficiently similar, then the equilibrium fraud equals the level preferred
by the lows. That is, if 𝜂𝐻 is sufficiently close to 𝜂𝐿 , then 𝐹 ∗ = 𝑃𝐿 .

(ii)

If the two types are sufficiently different, then the equilibrium fraud equals the level at which
the highs are indifferent between blowing the whistle and not. That is, if 𝜂𝐻 is sufficiently
large relative to 𝜂𝐿 , then 𝐹 ∗ = 𝑊 𝐻 0 .
The previous proposition implies that whistle-blowing may not affect the equilibrium level of

fraud if the managers are not sufficiently different. As illustration, assume that all managers are
identical. In a symmetric equilibrium, these managers would divide their preferred level of fraud.
Whistle-blowing would be entirely irrelevant. Now, assume that there are two types, but the highs are
so averse to committing fraud that they receive infinite disutility from any sanction. The threat of their
whistle-blowing would result in zero fraud being committed. It is the heterogeneity of managers that
allows whistle-blowing to reduce the equilibrium level of fraud from that preferred by the least sensitive
type.
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The source of heterogeneity need not be the disutility of sanction. We model disutility from
sanction as the source of heterogeneity because it is intrinsic to the agent, like risk-aversion, but can
encapsulate a number of different factors. We do not model differences in compensation because
heterogenous compensation may undermine the team framework. An owner could hire a manager with
a large salary and zero equity share, and this manager would exert zero effort (standard principal-agent
result) but would blow the whistle for any positive choice of fraud. This is equivalent to hiring an internal
auditor. One might expect a managerial team to hide their fraud from internal auditors, and likewise, to
hide their fraud from a manager obviously hired for the purpose of ratting them out – such a member
would not truly be part of the team. As we are examining the incentives to commit fraud and engage in
whistle-bloswing among members of a team, we assume that compensation is the same for all
managers.

Proposition 3: Granting amnesty to whistle-blowers does not alter the equilibrium level of fraud.

In equilibrium, highs do not commit fraud. When whistle-blowing occurs, punishment is based
on the individual choice of fraud, so highs would face zero punishment if they blew the whistle. As such,
there is no penalty to be reduced, so amnesty does not change their behavior. Lows are responsible for
all of the fraud, which is never greater than their preferred level. So, in equilibrium, it is not optimal for
the lows to blow the whistle, even with full amnesty. The conclusion is that amnesty has no effect on the
equilibrium.
The previous analysis implies that in a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, the fraud choices are
independent of the effort choices. Thus, while the managers are rational and anticipate the future
choices of fraud, their effort choices do not affect the fraud that will be committed. Each effort choice is
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a best-response correspondence with the effort choices of other managers in the team. The
assumptions that the value of the firm is a concave function of team effort and that the cost of effort is a
convex function of individual effort imply that choices of effort are strategic substitutes.
The manager’s problem, where 𝐸−𝑖 =
max EUi =
𝑒𝑖

𝑗 ≠𝑖 𝑒𝑗

and 𝐹 ∗ = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝐿 , 𝑊 𝐻 (0) is as follows:

𝑠 𝛼
𝐹∗
+
𝑣 𝑒𝑖 + 𝐸−𝑖 − 𝑠 + 𝐹 ∗ − 𝐹 𝑒 − 𝐷(𝐹 𝑒 ) − 𝐶 𝑒𝑖 − 𝜌𝜂𝑡 𝑋
,
𝑁 𝑁
𝑁

𝑡 = 𝐿, 𝐻

The first-order condition is
𝛼 ′
𝑣 𝑒𝑖 + 𝐸−𝑖 − 𝐶 ′ 𝑒𝑖 = 0
𝑁

(6)

The above implicitly defines the best-response function of a manager, given the share of equity and
effort exerted by other managers. The second order condition for maximization is satisfied.
𝛼 ′′
𝑣 𝑒𝑖 + 𝐸−𝑖 − 𝐶 ′′ 𝑒𝑖 < 0
𝑁

(7)

Notice that both types of managers are identical in the characteristics that determine the choice of
effort. It is, therefore, not surprising that in equilibrium the managers will choose identical effort levels.

Proposition 4: In equilibrium, both types of manager choose the same level of effort, 𝑒 ∗, which is
implicitly defined by:

𝛼 ′
𝑣
𝑁

𝑁𝑒 ∗ − 𝐶 ′ 𝑒 ∗ = 0

(8)

As discussed in the introduction, previous research focusing on single-agent models has shown
that equity compensation is a double-edged sword increasing both effort and fraud. While our focus
has been on a team setting, which allows us to explore the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions on the
level of fraud, the present model nevertheless yields predictions that are consistent with previous
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research. As shown by the next two propositions, an increase in equity compensation yields greater
team effort and greater team fraud.

Proposition 5: An increase in equity compensation, 𝛼, increases the equilibrium level of team effort,
𝐸 ∗ = 𝑁𝑒 ∗.
The value of the firm depends on team effort, so effort is akin to a public good in our model. The
benefits of effort accrue to all managers, but the cost of effort is borne privately. As such, each manager
takes the effort choices of other managers as given and chooses an effort level such that the marginal
benefit of additional effort equals the marginal cost. Increasing equity compensation increases the
marginal benefit of each unit of effort, while the marginal cost remains the same, causing all managers
to increase their effort.

Proposition 6: The equilibrium level of total fraud, 𝐹 ∗ , decreases if either equity compensation, 𝛼,
decreases or the probability of detection, 𝜌, increases.

Within the present model, owners may control fraud by reducing the level of equity
compensation or increasing auditing efforts so as to increase the probability that fraud will be detected.
Both options have corresponding costs. As shown by Proposition 5, decreasing equity compensation
implies less team effort and less overall firm value. Audits have direct costs as well as indirect costs, such
as diverting managerial efforts from productive endeavors to assisting auditors. While firms may not
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have much incentive to detect fraud (Robison and Santore, 2008), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act attempts to
increase the likelihood that fraud is detected.20

Conclusion
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in an attempt to reduce accounting fraud and restore
investor confidence in financial reporting. This paper has focused on the implications of two important
provisions of the Act: protections for whistle-blowing employees and the requirement that management
sign-off on financial statements. The latter provision essentially implies that a large-scale fraud requires
complicity among members of the managerial team.

Our analysis suggests that these provisions can decrease the total amount of fraud committed
by the team by inducing managers to act as monitoring agents. Although whistle-blowing is not
predicted to occur in equilibrium, the threat of whistle-blowing restricts fraudulent activity. This
indicates that Sarbanes-Oxley could be effective in reducing fraud without costly investment in internal
monitoring if its provisions are adequately enforced.

Our findings are consistent with previous theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship
between managerial fraud and equity compensation. In our team setting, greater equity compensation
induces greater effort from firm managers but also encourages greater misreporting of earnings. By
formally modeling whistle-blowing in teams, we are able to generalize the main results of previously
studied single-agent models while examining the likely effects of policy such as Sarbanes-Oxley.

20

Sections 408 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act identifies factors for the SEC staff and other regulators to use as
prospective problems in financial reporting, and Section 404 requires that firms publicly disclose “material
weaknesses” in their internal controls over financial reporting. Financial reporting practices now receive more
scrutiny from outsiders, increasing the probability of detection. (Alexander and Weiss, 2007)
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The analysis also sheds light on the importance of a managerial team’s composition. The threat
of whistle-blowing has an effect on the level of fraud only when there is sufficient heterogeneity in the
team. Since one can view each managerial hire as a random draw from a pool of applicants, a larger
team is more likely to have at least one manager who is highly sensitive to sanctions and thus willing to
blow the whistle for even minor infractions.

It is interesting to note that formal guidelines for reduced sentencing are absent from the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Although it is expected that prosecutors would grant some degree of leniency to
executives who decide to cooperate with the government, such reductions in penalty have not been
codified in law as they were in the case of whistle-blowing on price-fixing cartels21. Our results predict
that such amnesty provisions will have no effect on behavior because those managers who are most
likely to blow the whistle are not those managers who are responsible for the fraud.
Finally, our results were derived within a perfect information environment. If there is
uncertainty regarding either the preferences of the other managers or the fraud production technology,
then it is possible that whistle-blowing would occur, at least with some probability. However, one of the
insights of the analysis is that the frequency with which managers report fraudulent activity is a poor
indicator of the effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s provisions. The effectiveness of the Act must
be assessed in terms of the reduction of the level of fraudulent activity, not the frequency with which
fraud is reported.
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The US Antitrust Division created a “Leniency Policy” in 1978. Basically, a cartelist which reports the existence of
a cartel to regulators is granted immunity from punishment. Apesteguia, Dufwenberg, and Selten (2007) describe
and experimentally test the effectiveness of such a policy, and also provide a concise review of the relevant
literature.
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CHAPTER II: MANAGERIAL TEAMS, WHISTLE-BLOWING, AND FRAUD – AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

Introduction

To test the theory described in the previous chapter, we conduct a series of laboratory
experiments to test the theoretical predictions and to inform us of effects unexplained by our model.
Experimental evidence is most useful for determining the effect of different institutions (Davis and Holt,
1993), and here we investigate how changes in whistle-blower protections and team composition affect
behavior. With field data, we may only observe fraud that is detected and publically punished, while in a
controlled laboratory setting, we are able to observe attempted fraud and control for other
characteristics (e.g. team size, market performance, and support for whistle-blowing) that are
exogenous in real world settings.
From the model, we have four primary research hypotheses.

Research Hypothesis 1: If whistle-blowing is possible, the total fraud committed when both managers
face low sanctions is greater than when one of the two managers faces high sanctions.

Research Hypothesis 2: If whistle-blowing is not possible, the total fraud committed when both
managers face low sanctions will be the same as when one of the two managers faces high sanctions.

These hypotheses follow directly from Propositions 1 and 2 of the model. Basically, if managers in a
team are sufficiently close to identical, they will have little difficulty coordinating on a total amount of
fraud and whistle-blowing will be irrelevant. If managers have sharply different preferences, managers
who prefer more fraud can simply choose more fraud and overrule the preferences of managers who
prefer less, but if whistle-blowing is possible, then the managers who prefer more fraud must take into
account the level of fraud that will compel managers who prefer less to blow the whistle.
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Research Hypothesis 3: Whistle-blowing will not occur.

Research Hypothesis 4: Other things equal, granting amnesty does not alter the total level of fraud.

These hypotheses directly follow from Propositions 1 and 3 of the model, which suggest that
whistle-blowing will not occur in equilibrium and (because whistle-blowing will not occur) that granting
amnesty (reduced penalties) to whistle-blowers has no effect on the equilibrium choice of fraud. The
lack of whistle-blowing predicted by the theoretical model is derived from risk-neutral managers with
full information accurately restraining their fraud to avoid inducing other managers to blow the whistle.
If, in reality, managers have inaccurate beliefs regarding the preferences of other managers, errors in
choosing fraud can be expected. Since the theoretical prediction is zero whistle-blowing, errors in fraud
that induce whistle-blowing may only be made in the direction of greater whistle-blowing.
We use experimental evidence to shed light on what happens if the assumptions of the model
are relaxed. We anticipate observing whistle-blowing as we do in the ‘real world’, because we expect
managers to improperly coordinate and make mistakes regarding the preferences of other managers.
This phenomenon has likely entrapped corporate executives in the past. It is unlikely that the
perpetrators in recent high-profile accounting fraud cases committed fraud with the certainty that they
would be caught, but instead made a mistake or a gamble that failed. Failure to correctly coordinate in
the first stage of the game would render our predictions about whistle-blowing moot.

If whistle-blowing does occur, the theoretical result regarding amnesty no longer holds. We
therefore conjecture that amnesty will increase the rate of whistle-blowing. If managers commit ‘too
much’ fraud, amnesty decreases the cost of blowing the whistle, and will thus increase the rate of
whistle-blowing. Amnesty also creates an incentive to blow the whistle as a defense against other
managers choosing to blow the whistle. Suppose that a high-type manager commits a positive level of
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fraud, which is inconsistent with the theoretical equilibrium. The choice of blowing the whistle is
essentially a choice between a lottery (probability 𝜌 of being punished for total fraud and probability
(1 − 𝜌) of getting away with it) and a certainty equivalent (no fraud occurs, and a known penalty based
on the individual level of fraud is assessed). Without amnesty, the certainty equivalent decreases,
making it relatively less attractive to blow the whistle. With amnesty, the certainty equivalent remains
unchanged.

The promise of amnesty in the whistle-blowing stage may affect the choice of fraud in the first
stage. As such, we examine the effect, if any, of amnesty on the fraud attempted by managers. With full
amnesty, the certainty equivalent from blowing the whistle is the same at any individual choice of fraud
as it is with committing zero fraud without amnesty. Thus, without amnesty, committing fraud locks the
manager into a penalty if whistle-blowing occurs, while with amnesty managers are free to choose fraud
knowing it can be withdrawn if there is a coordination failure and total fraud is ‘too high’. This may lead
managers to attempt more fraud. On the other hand, the increased propensity for other managers to
blow the whistle may lead managers to attempt less to avoid the possibility of being caught with a high
penalty if he or she does not blow the whistle and another manager does. We attempt to determine this
effect through experimental evidence.

If there is out-of-equilibirum behavior, we expect amnesty to increase the incentive for low-type
managers to blow the whistle more than it does for highs. As stated before, without amnesty, a lowtype should never blow the whistle. With amnesty, a low-type should blow the whistle if he or she
expects any manager in the team to blow the whistle.

27

Experimental Design
The objective of these experiments is to allow empirical tests of the theoretical propositions put
forth on the effect of heterogeneous preferences for fraud and institutional support for whistle-blowing
on fraudulent activity. Specifically, we test whether whistle-blowing ‘matters’, and the degree to which
the decision to engage in fraud is affected by preferences of team managers interacting with an ability
to blow the whistle. Furthermore, we test whether and how amnesty provisions (penalty reductions for
whistle-blowers) affects behavior.

To perform these tests, we conduct laboratory experiments wherein we allow and disallow
whistle-blowing, have teams of identical managers and managers with different sanctions for detected
fraud, and wherein those who blow the whistle are still punished for the fraud they attempted and
wherein those who blow the whistle are granted full amnesty for their attempted fraud. With two states
for each of three treatment variables, a full-design would usually require eight (23 ) treatments, but
amnesty is only an issue when whistle-blowing is possible, and thus treatments with amnesty but no
whistle-blowing are not required. Thus, there are six total treatments, each of which is described in
Table 1.

In spring of 2009, 180 subjects recruited from the general population at the University of
Tennessee participated in one of 12 experimental sessions conducted at the Experimental Economics
Laboratory. There are two sessions (replications) of each treatment, with 16 subjects in the first and 14
subjects in the second (N=30 per treatment). Approximately 82% of subjects had previously participated
in an economics experiment. Average earnings were roughly $20.00, and sessions lasted for
approximately one hour on average.
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Table 1: Treatment Descriptions
Treatment Code
NW-LL-NA
NW-HL-NA
W- LL – NA

W-HL-NA

W-LL-A

W-HL-A

Description
No whistle-blowing. Both managers are ‘lows’. No amnesty (although this is
irrelevant since there is no whistle-blowing).
No whistle-blowing. One manager is ‘low’ and the other is ‘high’. No
amnesty (although this is irrelevant since there is no whistle-blowing).
Whistle-blowing. Both managers are ‘low’ types.
No amnesty for whistle-blowers (a manager pays the same penalty if she
blows the whistle as she would if the other manager blows the whistle).
Whistle-blowing. One manager is ‘low’ and the other is ‘high’.
No amnesty for whistle-blowers (a manager pays the same penalty if she
blows the whistle as she would if the other manager blows the whistle).
Whistle-blowing. Both managers are ‘low penalty’ type.
Amnesty for whistle-blowers (whistle-blowers pay no penalty for attempted
fraud).
Whistle-blowing. One manager is ‘low’ and the other is ‘high’.
Amnesty for whistle-blowers (whistle-blowers pay no penalty for attempted
fraud).
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In all six treatments, subjects played the role of a manager in a group with one other manager.
Subjects were given a project with a true value of $100, but were given the opportunity to fraudulently
inflate that value. Both subjects in a group simultaneously chose how much fraud to commit, the sum of
which was added to the actual value to form the reported value. Subjects stood to earn 50% of the
reported value, penalties for fraud notwithstanding. There was then a 25% chance22 that any fraudulent
inflation would be detected and penalties would be levied on both managers based on the total amount
of fraud committed. In treatments with whistle-blowing (W-LL-NA, W-HL-NA, W-LL-A, W-HL-A), an
intermediate stage was inserted where managers were given the option of preventing the fraud
(whistle-blowing) after the total had been revealed but before any detection would occur. If either
manager chose to blow the whistle, no fraud occurred but each manager was punished based on their
individual choice of fraud. In the amnesty treatments (W-HL-A, W-LL-A), a whistle-blowing manager was
exempt from penalty. Finally, in treatments with different sanctions(NW-HL-NA, W-HL-NA, W-HL-A),
subjects were randomly assigned a type, high or low, and remained that type for the entirety of the
experiment while being randomly matched with a player of the different type each round. Sanctions for
each level of fraud were chosen discretely to give clean integer predictions while following the
assumptions and structure of the theory. Subjects were given tables with payoffs for all possible
outcomes in the game. Instructions for all treatments, as well as these tables (from which all parameters
can be determined), are located in Appendix B and Appendix C.
Decisions were made via computer. The experiments were programmed and conducted with the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The software collected all decisions and made all relevant earnings
calculations. Written instructions were provided to each participant and displayed on-screen. The
experiment moderator read instructions aloud, one screen at a time, and any questions were answered
22

Five rounds (25% of the twenty) were randomly chosen in advance for the fraud to be detected, to hold the
timing of detection rounds constant across all treatments.
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prior to proceeding to the next instruction screen. During the instructions, participants were asked to
answer four questions on the computer to assess their understanding of how earnings are calculated,
and were unable to proceed until the questions were correctly answered. Those who were unable to
perform the calculations on their own were able to ask an experiment moderator for help, who would
then re-explain procedures and field questions. Following the instructions, there was one unpaid
practice round, where questions were encouraged and addressed. Upon conclusion of the experiment, a
short questionnaire was administered to obtain demographic information and qualitative assessments
of the experiment design and instruction clarity.
In order to investigate the role of risk-attitudes23, we include in our econometric analysis a risk
measure elicited through a lottery-choice procedure (e.g. Holt and Laury (2002)). We borrow the
procedure from Evans et. al (2009), and its validity is determined by whether risk attitudes are similar
across the risk elicitation and fraud experiments. We hope this is so, since the procedure used to elicit
risk attitudes is reasonably similar to the decision made in the fraud experiment: in both, subjects
choose between lotteries (and with whistle-blowing, a certainty equivalent).
Evans et. al (2009) make two changes to the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure that we duplicate
here. 24 First, to reduce the effects of potential participant confusion, participants made choices
between a certain payoff and a lottery, rather than between two lotteries. Second, the first and last
decision tasks involved a choice between two certain (different) payoffs to test subject understanding
and payoff saliency.

23

Since increasing the sanction increases the risk, is it straightforward to see that the sensitivity to sanction could
easily stand as a risk-aversion term. Harvesting and sorting student participants by risk types was prohibitively
expensive with the resources available, so we induce the effect by assigning different sanction types. However,
greater aversion to risk will interact with the sanctions, and must be controlled for.
24
The Holt and Laury (2002) procedure is frequently used in economic experiments(e.g. Evans et al. (2009),
Dickinson (2009) and Gangadharan and Nemes (2009)) and in field experiments (e.g. Harrison et al. (2007) and
Shearer and Bellemare (2006)).
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Table 2 presents the eleven decision tasks in the risk preference experiment. As a reference
point, Table 2 also presents the implied range of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, r, for the CRRA
utility function 𝑈 𝑥 =

𝑥 1−𝑟
1−𝑟

for an individual who switches from the certain payoff (Option A) to an

uncertain payoff (Option B) at this gamble. Choices are simultaneous (without feedback) and one
randomly determined decision task determines payoffs. To prevent spillover effects, announcement of
the elicitation experiment outcome occurs after the completion of the fraud experiment.

Results
The experiment was parameterized such that 𝑃𝐿 = 80 (risk-neutral low-type managers
maximize their expected utility when there are 80 units of total fraud) and 𝑊 𝐻 (0) = 40 (a risk-neutral
high-type manager who has committed 0 units of fraud will tolerate a maximum of 40 units of total
fraud before blowing the whistle). Table 3 presents the theoretical predictions for attempted fraud by
the group, which is 𝑃𝐿 for treatments where there is no whistle-blowing or no high-types, and 𝑊 𝐻 (0)
for treatments with whistle-blowing and both low and high types. All treatments save NW_HL_NA show
a statistically significantly greater average observed amount of attempted fraud than the prediction.

Table 4 presents the theoretical predictions for effective fraud by the group. Effective fraud is
the amount of fraud that is not stopped within the company by whistle-blowers.. Effective fraud is equal
to the attempted fraud if whistle-blowing does not occur, and equals zero if whistle-blowing prevents
the fraud. From the perspective of shareholders and policymakers, effective fraud may be the relevant
measure because it determines the damage to the firm value and the reputation of the market, while
attempted fraud is relevant for studying the choices of managers.
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Table 2. Parameters and Results of Risk Elicitation Experiment
Decision
Task

Option A

1

Receive $3.00

Option B

CRRA coefficient of
relative risk
aversion (r)
–

Proportion of
Participants

0% chance of $5.00
0
100% chance of $0.50
2
Receive $3.00
10% chance of $5.00
0.006
[-, -3.508]
90% chance of $0.50
3
Receive $3.00
20% chance of $5.00
[-3.507, -2.146]
0
80% chance of $0.50
4
Receive $3.00
30% chance of $5.00
[-2.145, -1.336]
0
70% chance of $0.50
5
Receive $3.00
40% chance of $5.00
[-1.335, -.742]
0.072
60% chance of $0.50
6
Receive $3.00
50% chance of $5.00
[-.741, -.250]
0.094
50% chance of $0.50
7
Receive $3.00
60% chance of $5.00
[-.249, .194]
0.200
40% chance of $0.50
8
Receive $3.00
70% chance of $5.00
[.195, .631]
0.356
30% chance of $0.50
9
Receive $3.00
80% chance of $5.00
[.632, 1.112]
0.172
20% chance of $0.50
10
Receive $3.00
90% chance of $5.00
[1.113, 1.758]
0.056
10% chance of $0.50
11
Receive $3.00
100% chance of $5.00
0.039
[1.759, ]
0% chance of $0.50
Notes: The risk coefficient corresponds to an individual that switches from the certain payoff (Option A)
and the uncertain payoff (Option B) at this task. One individual accepted the $3.00 certainty equivalent
over a 100% chance of $5.00.
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Table 3. Mean Level of Attempted Fraud by Group
Treatment

Predicted

NW-LL-NA
NW-HL-NA
W-LL-NA
W-HL-NA
W-LL-A
W-HL-A

80.00
80.00
80.00
40.00
80.00
40.00

Observed
(std. error)
89.40 (2.51)
79.73 (4.70)
91.60 (3.28)
51.80 (3.99)
85.40 (1.79)
94.33 (4.64)

Student t-test
p-value
0.002
0.956
0.003
0.010
0.009
0.000

Observed values are group means over all periods. N=15 for each treatment cell. H0: Predicted = Observed

Table 4. Total Level of Effective Fraud by Group
Treatment

Predicted

Observed (std. error)

NW-LL-NA
NW-HL-NA
W-LL-NA
W-HL-NA
W-LL-A
W-HL-A

80.00
80.00
80.00
40.00
80.00
40.00

89.40 (2.51)
79.73 (4.70)
84.67 (2.65)
40.93 (3.30)
51.67 (4.28)
19.47 (4.45)

Student t-test
p-value
0.002
0.956
0.101
0.781
0.000
0.000

Observed values are group means over all periods. N=15 for each treatment cell. H0: Predicted = Observed
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Attempted and effective fraud are, by definition, the same when whistle-blowing is not possible,
so there is no difference between the two in those treatments. Effective fraud is slightly lower if
whistle-blowing is possible and whistle-blowers face full penalties for their attempted fraud, and
substantially lower if whistle-blowing is possible and whistle-blowers are given full amnesty for their
attempted fraud.

Observed effective fraud is statistically significantly greater than the predicted value when both
managers are low-types and whistle-blowing is not possible. We are unable to reject our null hypothesis
that observed effective fraud is statistically different from the predicted value when there is a low-type
and high-type manager on a team and whistle-blowing is not possible, or when whistle-blowing is
possible and there is no amnesty. Finally, when whistle-blowers are granted amnesty, observed effective
fraud is statistically significantly below predicted values.

Table 5 presents the predicted and observed changes between treatments. There are seven
ways to change one treatment variable while holding the other two constant. For example, the first row
holds the types (both low) and amnesty provision (no amnesty) constant, and shows the change when
the no-whistleblowing regime was changed to a whistle-blowing regime. The predicted change is 0, and
the observed change is 2.20, and we find we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the predicted
and observed means are equal, or in the latter case with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test25, that the
distributions are the same.

25

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is more appropriate as it does not require any distributional assumptions. The ttest is reported because it is common.
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Table 5. Changes Across Treatments of Group Levels of Attempted Fraud
Treatment Change
(values held
constant)
NW->W (LL, NA)
NW->W (HL, NA)
LL->HL (W, NA)
LL->HL (NW, NA)
LL->HL (W, A)
NA->A (LL, W)
NA->A (HL, W)

Predicted
Change

Observed
Change

Student t-test**
p-value

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
p-value

0.00
-40.00
-40.00
0.00
-40.00
0.00
0.00

2.20
-27.93
-39.80
-9.67
8.93
-6.20
42.53

0.597
0.000
0.000
0.084
0.089
0.110
0.000

0.876
0.005
0.000
0.116
0.014
0.273
0.000

Observed values are group means over all periods. N=15 for each treatment cell.
**H0: Observed Change = 0.

The directions of observed changes between treatments match the predictions for five changes.
Two treatment changes do not have the theoretically expected result. Moving from groups with two
low-type managers (henceforth referred to as LL) to groups with a high and low type manager
(henceforth referred to as HL), theory predicts a decrease of 40 units of attempted fraud, but we
observe an increase of 8.93 units. Likewise, theory would suggest there is no change from granting
amnesty, yet we observe an increase of 42.53 units of fraud when amnesty is implemented in the HL
case. This suggests that amnesty encourages managers to attempt more fraud, possibly due the fact it
allows managers to correct for coordination errors after they have been made.

Table 6 presents the same seven treatment changes, but with effective fraud. As with
attempted fraud, the directions of the observed changes between treatments are as predicted for five
changes and the changes that do not correspond to theory involve amnesty provisions. Theory suggests
that amnesty has no effect, but for both possible group compositions, LL and HL, the observed changes
are -33.00 and -21.47, respectively, when moving from a no-amnesty to amnesty state. This suggests,
contrary to our fourth research hypothesis, that amnesty provisions simultaneously increase attempted
fraud and decrease effective fraud, likely by making blowing the whistle cheaper.
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Table 6. Changes Across Treatment of Group Levels of Effective Fraud
Treatment Change
(values held
constant)
NW->W (LL, NA)
NW->W (HL, NA)
LL->HL (W, NA)
LL->HL (NW, NA)
LL->HL (W, A)
NA->A (LL, W)
NA->A (HL, W)

Predicted
Change

Observed
Change

Student t-test
p-value

Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
p-value

0.00
-40.00
-40.00
0.00
-40.00
0.00
0.00

-4.73
-38.80
-43.73
-9.67
-32.20
-33.00
-21.47

0.206
0.000
0.000
0.084
0.000
0.000
0.001

0.273
0.000
0.000
0.116
0.000
0.000
0.000

Observed values are group means over all periods. N=15 for each treatment cell. H0: Observed Change = 0.

We now examine behavior at the individual level. Figures 4-6 show the total attempted and
effective levels of fraud over time, as discussed before, as well as the individual choices of fraud and
their predictions for each type. We will walk through a numerical explanation of the difference between
treatments, but readers may find it useful to refer to these figures for a visual representation of the
data.

Table 7 presents predicted and observed choices of fraud at the individual level for the both
types: L and H. In the LL treatments there are two asymmetric equilibria (0, 80; 20, 60) and one
symmetric equilibrium (40, 40). We compare our results to the symmetric equilibrium. We are unable to
reject the null hypothesis that the observed choice of attempted fraud is equal to the predicted value in
five of the six treatments for the lows. The highs overshoot their predicted levels of fraud in every
treatment, which is not unexpected due to boundary effects (e.g. Andreoni (1995), Chan et al (1994)).
the aforementioned boundary effects. In the HL treatment with no amnesty, the lows commit less fraud
than the equilibrium prediction, but this is likely compensation for the highs committing more than the
equilibrium prediction. The previously discussed group-level analysis found total fraud to be close to the
predicted values.
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Figure 4: Fraud when whistle-blowing not possible.
Items in the legend separated by / have the same value.
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Figure 5: Fraud when whistle-blowing possible but no amnesty.
Items in the legend separated by / have the same value.
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Figure 6: Fraud when whistle-blowing possible and there is amnesty.
Items in the legend separated by / have the same value.
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Table 7. Individual Fraud
Treatment Low
Prediction

Low Observed
(std. error)

Student ttest p-value

High
Prediction

High
Student t-test
Observed
p-value
(std. error)
NW-LL-NA 40-sym
44.70 (4.05)
0.255
N/A
N/A
N/A
NW-HL-NA 80.00
51.27 (5.07)
0.001
0.00
28.47 (5.99)
0.000
W-LL-NA
40-sym
45.80 (3.50)
0.108
N/A
N/A
N/A
W-HL-NA
40.00
28.00 (6.19)
0.073
0.00
23.80 (4.89)
0.000
W-LL-A
40-sym
42.70 (3.23)
0.410
N/A
N/A
N/A
W-HL-A
40.00
48.33 (7.29)
0.272
0.00
46.00 (7.00)
0.000
Observed values are individual means over all periods. N=30 for each LL treatment cell, N=15 for HL. H0:
Predicted = Observed
Table 8 shows how subjects performed relative to the theoretically predicted behavior. Predicted profit
is the expected profit over all rounds.26 If all managers behaved honestly, and no fraud was committed,
both types would earn $50 in each round. In the treatments with no whistle-blowing, subjects earned
more than 80% of what they would earn had they played the equilibrium strategy. Low-types earned
approximately $13 more per round than they would have if fraud had not been committed, while hightypes earned approximately $23 less. When whistle-blowing was possible, but there was no amnesty,
both lows and highs earned less. The lows earn approximately the same amount less than predicted
regardless of whether or not the treatment is LL or HL. When there is amnesty, both types earn even
less than whistle-blowing without amnesty. Regardless of whistle-blowing or amnesty being possible ,
lows earn about the same whether the treatment is LL or HL. This decrease in earnings from whistleblowing, and, subsequently, amnesty provisions, may have important implications for contracts needed
to reach reservation utility for managers.

26

For example, in NW-LL-NA, the expected total fraud is 80. This means that in 75% of the rounds, the profit is $90.
In 25% of the rounds, the profit is $30, for an expected value of $75 for the lows.
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Table 8. Individual Profit
Treatment

Low
Predicted
Profit

Low
Observed

Low
Difference

Low
Efficiency

High
Predicted
Profit

High
Observed

High
Difference

High
Efficiency

NW-LLNA
NW-HLNA
W-LL-NA
W-HL-NA
W-LL-A
W-HL-A

$75.00

$63.02

$11.98

84.03%

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

$75.00

$62.99

$12.01

83.99%

$33.75

$27.48

$6.27

81.42%

$75.00
$65.00
$75.00
$65.00

$49.35
$38.38
$37.08
$27.49

$25.65
$26.62
$37.92
$37.51

65.80%
59.05%
49.44%
42.29%

N/A
$52.50
N/A
$52.50

N/A
$24.42
N/A
$3.33*

N/A
$28.08
N/A
$49.17

N/A
46.51%
N/A
6.34%*

*One high subject was detected or had the whistle blown on him/her while committing large amounts of fraud
multiple times. Dropping that subject results in an observed of $14.54 and an efficiency of 27.69%.

We now turn to a regression analysis of the individual choice of fraud. Table 9 presents the
summary statistics for individual-level variables. Table 10 presents regression results for four
specifications. The first specification contains only the treatment variables and thus has identical results
to that of Table 7. The second specification factors in a subject’s risk posture. In the risk-elicitation
mechanism, six safe choices corresponds to risk-neutrality. In the regression, the number of safe choices
is normalized so that a value of zero represents risk-neutrality, with negative numbers representing riskloving preferences, and positive numbers representing increasing risk-aversion. The third specification
factors in last period results, such as whether or not subjects were penalized in the preceding period,
and changes over time. Finally, the fourth specification contains risk-aversion, last period’s results, and
the reciprocal of the period to account for learning effects.
As the magnitude and significance of coefficients remain relatively stable across the
specifications, we will restrict discussion to the fourth, full model. In that model, the coefficients on the
treatment variables represent the choice of fraud for a risk-neutral, low-type manager who has played
the game for an infinite number of rounds and has completed learning, and was not penalized in the
preceding period.
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Table 9. Description of Individual Level Variables
Variable name

Description

W_HL_NA
W_LL_NA
W_HL_A
W_LL_A
NW_HL_NA
NW_LL_NA
Risk Posture
Risk Posture * W_HL_NA
Risk Posture * W_LL_NA
Risk Posture * W_HL_A
Risk Posture * W_LL_A
Risk Posture * NW_HL_NA
Risk Posture * NW_LL_NA
IsHigh* Risk Posture *W_HL_NA
IsHigh* Risk Posture *W_HL_A
IsHigh* Risk Posture *NW_HL_NA
WhistleBefore
WhistleBefore * W_HL_NA

= 1 if treatment is whistle-blowing, two types, no amnesty.
= 1 if treatment is whistle-blowing, one type, no amnesty
= 1 if treatment is whistle-blowing, two types, full amnesty
= 1 if treatment is whistle-blowing, one type, full amnesty
= 1 if treatment is no whistle-blowing, two types, no amnesty
= 1 if treatment is no whistle-blowing, one type, no amnesty
= 0 if player made 6 safe choices in risk-elicitation mechanism.
= 0 if risk neutral and treatment is W_HL_NA
= 0 if risk neutral and treatment is W_LL_NA
= 0 if risk neutral and treatment is W_HL_A
= 0 if risk neutral and treatment is W_LL_A
= 0 if risk neutral and treatment is NW_HL_NA
= 0 if risk neutral and treatment is NW_LL_NA
=0 if risk neutral high-type and treatment is W_HL_NA
=0 if risk neutral high-type and treatment is W_LL_NA
=0 if risk neutral high-type and treatment is NW_HL_NA
=1 if whistle was blown in individual’s group last period
= 1 if whistle was blown in individual’s group last period and
treatment is W_HL_NA
= 1 if whistle was blown in individual’s group last period and
treatment is W_LL_NA
= 1 if whistle was blown in individual’s group last period and
treatment is W_HL_A
= 1 if whistle was blown in individual’s group last period and
treatment is W_LL_A
= 1 if high-type whistle was blown in individual’s group last
period and treatment is W_HL_NA
= 1 if high-type whistle was blown in individual’s group last
period and treatment is W_HL_A
=1 if detected by outside authorities if whistle not blown
= 1 if detected before and treatment is W_HL_NA
= 1 if detected before and treatment is W_LL_NA
= 1 if detected before and treatment is W_HL_A
= 1 if detected before and treatment is W_LL_A
= 1 if detected before and treatment is NW_HL_NA
= 1 if detected before and treatment is NW_LL_NA

WhistleBefore * W_LL_NA
WhistleBefore* W_HL_A
WhistleBefore * W_LL_A
WhistleBefore*W_HL_NA*IsHigh
WhistleBefore*W_HL_A*IsHigh
DetectedBefore
DetectedBefore * W_HL_NA
DetectedBefore * W_LL_NA
DetectedBefore * W_HL_A
DetectedBefore * W_LL_A
DetectedBefore * W_HL_NA
DetectedBefore * NW_LL_NA
IsHigh*DetectedBefore*W_HL_NA
IsHigh*DetectedBefore*W_HL_A
IsHigh*DetectedBefore*NW_HL_NA

Sample mean
(std. dev.)
0.167 (0.372)
0.167 (0.372)
0.167 (0.372)
0.167 (0.372)
0.167 (0.372)
0.167 (0.372)
0.783 (1.488)
0.161 (0.776)
0.100 (0.668)
0.122 (0.834)
0.117 (0.509)
0.122 (0.574)
0.161 (0.625)
0.106 (0.466)
0.039 (0.487)
0.050 (0.338)
0.224 (0.417)
0.043 (0.202)
0.009 (0.094)
0.116 (0.320)
0.057 (0.231)
0.021 (0.145)
0.058 (0.233)
0.188 (0.391)
0.027 (0.161)
0.038 (0.191)
0.012 (0.107)
0.028 (0.166)
0.042 (0.200)
0.042 (0.200)
0.013 (0.114)
0.006 (0.076)
0.021 (0.143)

1/Period * W_HL_NA
1/Period * W_LL_NA
1/Period * W_HL_A
1/Period * W_LL_A
1/Period * W_HL_NA
1/Period * NW_LL_NA

=1 if high-type and detected before and treatment is W_HL_NA
= 1 if high-type and detected before and treatment is W_HL_A
= 1 if high-type and detected before and treatment is
NW_HL_NA
= Reciprocal of period * 1 if treatment is W_HL_NA
= Reciprocal of period * 1 if treatment is W_LL_NA
= Reciprocal of period * 1 if treatment is W_HL_A
= Reciprocal of period * 1 if treatment is W_LL_A
= Reciprocal of period * 1 if treatment is NW_HL_NA
= Reciprocal of period * 1 if treatment is NW_LL_NA

1/Period * W_HL_NA * IsHigh
1/Period * W_HL_A * IsHigh
1/Period * NW_HL_NA * IsHigh

=IfHigh* Reciprocal of period * 1 if treatment is W_HL_NA
=IfHigh* Reciprocal of period * 1 if treatment is W_HL_A
=IfHigh* Reciprocal of period * 1 if treatment is NW_HL_NA

0.015 (0.080)
0.015 (0.080)
0.015 (0.080)

Attempted Fraud (dependent)

= Attempted fraud by an individual

60.98 (29.20)
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0.030 (0.111)
0.030 (0.111)
0.030 (0.111)
0.030 (0.111)
0.030 (0.111)
0.030 (0.111)

Table 10. OLS Regression (Both Types)
Predicted Value

Attempted Fraud
Treatment Only

Attempted Fraud w/risk

Attempted Fraud
w/time

Attempted Fraud w/risk
and time

W_HL_NA

40.00

28.00**
(6.00)

31.29**
(3.90)

29.26*
(6.43)

33.86
(5.55)

W_LL_NA

40.00-sym

45.80*
(3.45)

45.91
(3.79)

43.68
(4.02)

43.79
(4.31)

W_HL_A

40.00

48.33
(7.07)

47.41
(5.57)

33.24
(5.30)

36.37
(7.09)

W_LL_A

40.00-sym

42.70
(3.19)

41.37
(4.33)

41.05
(2.73)

39.76
(3.86)

NW_HL_NA

80.00

51.27***
(4.92)

43.22***
(4.60)

48.03***
(4.87)

47.86***
(5.44)

NW_LL_NA

40.00-sym

44.70
(4.00)

52.88***
(4.38)

41.53
(4.00)

49.70**
(4.40)

Ishigh*W_HL_NA

-40.00

-4.20***
(7.65)

-6.19***
(7.01)

-7.02***
(8.30)

-7.49***
(7.38)

Ishigh*W_HL_A

-40.00

-2.33***
(9.80)

-6.50***
(11.36)

-1.19***
(10.71)

-4.72***
(11.99)

Ishigh*NW_HL_NA

-80.00

-22.80***
(7.62)

-15.59***
(8.51)

-23.94***
(7.70)

-16.74***
(8.47)

Risk Posture *W_HL_NA

(-)

-7.84**
(3.04)

-7.79**
(3.07)

RiskPosture*W_LL_NA

(-)

-0.19
(1.99)

-0.19
(1.98)

RiskPosture*W_HL_A

(-)

-2.51
(3.32)

-2.36
(3.30)

RiskPosture*W_LL_A

(-)

1.90
(3.92)

1.88
(3.93)

Risk Posture*NW_HL_NA

(-)

0.19
(2.54)

0.19
(2.55)
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Table 10 continued…
Predicted Value
Risk Posture* NW_LL_NA

Attempted Fraud
Treatment Only

Attempted Fraud w/risk

(-)

Attempted Fraud
w/time

Attempted Fraud w/risk
and time

-8.46**
(2.20)

-8.46***
(2.21)

Ishigh*RiskPosture*W_HL_NA

5.29
(4.45)

4.64
(4.29)

Ishigh* RiskPosture*W_HL_A

6.06
(5.03)

5.33
(5.01)

-11.93**
(4.69)

-11.93**
(4.71)

Ishigh* RiskPosture*NW_HL_NA
Detected Before*W_HL_NA

-1.12
(3.52)

-1.10
(3.58)

Detected Before*W_LL_NA

0.83
(2.44)

0.83
(2.44)

Detected Before*W_HL_A

13.42
(8.09)

13.76*
(7.71)

Detected Before*W_LL_A

2.58
(2.89)

2.64
(2.85)

Detected Before*NW_HL_NA

10.71**
(4.58)

10.71**
(4.59)

Detected Before*NW_LL_NA

11.07***
(3.28)

11.07***
(3.29)

DetectedBefore* IsHigh *W_HL_NA

11.15
(7.82)

11.42
(7.79)

DetectedBefore* IsHigh *W_HL_A

-19.08
(13.89)

-18.75
(13.78)

DetectedBefore* IsHigh *NW_HL_NA

3.11
(7.30)

3.11
(7.31)

Whistle Before*W_HL_NA

-6.88
(5.34)

-4.98
(4.49)

Whistle Before*W_LL_NA

8.50
(6.45)

8.50
(6.44)

Whistle Before*W_HL_A

14.23*
(7.62)

13.26*
(7.60)
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Table 10 continued…
Predicted Value

Attempted Fraud
w/time

Attempted Fraud w/risk
and time

Whistle Before*W_LL_A

3.94
(4.03)

3.86
(4.14)

WhistleBefore* IsHigh *W_HL_NA

-3.40
(7.08)

-5.94
(6.31)

WhistleBefore* IsHigh *W_HL_A

1.37
(10.69)

1.07
(10.50)

1/P*W_HL_NA

3.81
(3.66)

4.37
(3.47)

1/P*W_LL_NA

8.22
(7.15)

8.22
(7.16)

1/P*W_HL_A

23.80**
(10.37)

23.16**
(10.29)

1/P*W_LL_A

-0.75
(5.40)

-0.77
(5.41)

1/P*NW_HL_NA

3.14
(3.90)

3.14
(3.91)

1/P*NW_LL_NA

2.25
(3.52)

2.25
(3.52)

1/P*IsHigh*W_HL_NA

10.61
(7.76)

9.88
(7.65)

1/P* IsHigh *W_HL_A

-4.22
(16.43)

-4.41
(16.52)

1/P* IsHigh *NW_HL_NA

2.05
(6.54)

2.05
(6.56)

F
R

2

N (observations)
N (subjects)

Attempted Fraud
Treatment Only

Attempted Fraud w/risk

83.61

55.48

28.97

24.96

0.68

0.70

0.69

0.71

3600
180

3600
180

3600
180

3600
180
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We cannot reject the null hypothesis for four of our six treatment coefficients that the
estimated coefficients are equal to their predicted values. Risk-neutral low-types commit slightly more
fraud than predicted when whistle-blowing is not possible. When the high-types are expected to
commit 40 units less fraud than the lows, they commit 7.49 and 4.72 units less respectively, and when
they are expected to commit 80 units less, they commit 16.74 units less on average.

Risk-aversion has a negative effect in some treatments. There is no difference in the effect of
risk aversion on the highs and the lows when whistle-blowing is possible, but when it is not possible, the
effect of risk-aversion on highs is greater. Being detected in the previous period only has a strongly
significant effect when whistle-blowing is not possible, which is likely due to the gambler’s fallacy
(Camerer (1995)). In treatments with whistle-blowing, a manager’s ability to blow the whistle acts as a
deterministic reason to restrain fraud, and so the effect of the gambler’s fallacy is reduced. Interestingly,
there seems to only be a significant effect from having the whistle-blown on an individual in the
previous period when amnesty is possible, wherein the choice of fraud increases. Finally, learning only
has a strong effect on the decision of lows in the W-HL-A treatment, which is arguably the most complex
one to coordinate in.

Table 11 presents regression results for the high-types only. These can be found using the
interaction effects from Table 10, but are presented here for ease of understanding. Maintaining focus
on the fourth specification, the expected choice of fraud for a risk-neutral high type is zero in all
treatments, and in all treatments, the actual choice of fraud is substantially higher. However, none of
the coefficients are statistically different from each other (F=0.96, p=0.391).

Interestingly, risk-aversion has the expected negative impact on the choice of fraud when
whistle-blowing is not possible. Being detected in the previous period causes an increase in fraud of
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Table 11. OLS Regression (High-Types Only)
Predicted
Value

Attempted Fraud
Treatment Only

Attempted Fraud
w/risk

Attempted Fraud
w/risk and lags

Attempted Fraud
w/risk and all

W_HL_NA

0.00

23.80***
(4.77)

27.03***
(4.77)

22.24***
(5.30)

26.37***
(4.92)

W_HL_A

0.00

46.00***
(6.85)

44.34***
(7.07)

32.06***
(9.41)

31.65***
(9.76)

NW_HL_NA

0.00

28.47***
(5.86)

35.51***
(6.51)

24.08***
(6.02)

31.13***
(6.56)

Risk Posture *W_HL_NA

(-)

-2.55
(3.28)

-3.14
(3.03)

Risk Posture*W_HL_A

(-)

3.55
(3.82)

2.98
(3.81)

Risk Posture* NW_HL_NA

(-)

-11.74***
(3.97)

-11.74***
(3.99)

Detected
Before*W_HL_NA

10.04
(7.05)

10.32
(6.99)

Detected Before*W_HL_A

-5.70
(11.40)

-4.99
(11.53)

Detected
Before*NW_HL_NA

13.82**
(5.74)

13.82**
(5.75)

Whistle Before*W_HL_NA

-10.28**
(4.69)

-10.91**
(4.48)

Whistle Before*W_HL_A

15.60**
(7.57)

14.33*
(7.32)

1/P*W_HL_NA

14.42**
(6.92)

14.25**
(6.89)

1/P*W_HL_A

19.58
(12.86)

18.75
(13.05)

1/P*NW_HL_NA

5.18
(5.31)

5.18
(5.32)

F
R

2

N (observations)
N (subjects)

31.20

19.74

9.86

10.63

0.51

0.54

0.54

0.56

900
45

900
45

900
45

900
45

*, **, and *** denote parameter is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. For
treatment variables, *, **, and *** denote parameter is statistically different from predicted value at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance
levels , respectively.
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greatest magnitude in the no whistle-blowing treatment, likely due to the gambler’s fallacy. As for the
lows, whistle-blowing in the previous period decreases fraud when there is no amnesty, but increases it
when there is amnesty.

Given that, in contrast to Hypothesis 3, we do observe whistle-blowing, we now examine the
whistle-blowing decision itself. Table 12 shows the proportion of rounds in which each type elected to
blow the whistle in each treatment, and what percentage of groups had at least one whistle-blower in a
given period. Amnesty resulted in a 30.7 percentage point increase in the frequency of a group selfreporting its fraud in the LL case, and a 46.0 percentage point increase in the HL case. Likewise, moving
from LL to HL increased the rate of whistle-blowing by 21.4 percentage points when there was no
amnesty, and 36.7 percentage points when there was amnesty. Something that immediately stands out
is that in the HL groups, low and high types tend to blow the whistle at the same rate. This makes sense
in the amnesty treatment, as a manager who has committed a positive level of fraud is strictly better off
blowing the whistle if he or she expects another member to blow the whistle, but this is not true for
when amnesty is not possible.

Table 12. Rates of whistle-blowing
Treatment % Highs
Predicted to
Blow Whistle

% Highs
Blowing
Whistle

% Lows
Predicted to
Blow Whistle

% Lows
Blowing
Whistle

% Groups Had At Least
One
Whistle-blower

W-LL-NA
W-HL-NA
W-LL-A
W-HL-A

N/A
14.3%
N/A
52.7%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

2.8%
13.3%
22.5%
55.7%

5.6%
27.0%
36.3%
73.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

49

Table 13 and Table 14 present whistle-blowing conditional on a manager’s choice of fraud and
the choice of ther other player, respectively. In the W-HL-NA treatment, the vast majority of whistleblowing by lows came from lows who had chosen zero fraud. This, along with comments made by
several of the participants, implies there may be some spite at work despite random rematching of
groups each round. We examine this during the subsequent regression analysis.
Table 15 and Table 16 present the number of lows and highs, respectively, who chose to blow
the whistle after choosing a specific level of fraud for each treatment, as well as the percentage of
players of that type who chose that level of fraud and elected to blow the whistle. W-LL-NA has rates of
whistle-blowing low enough to be largely dismissed. In W-HL-NA, there is a clear trend for both highs
and lows to only blow the whistle if they themselves committed a small amount of fraud. In the amnesty
treatments, the propensity to blow the whistle tends to increase as the fraud chosen by a manager
increases, aside from spikes for the lows at a choice of zero fraud.

Table 13. Whistle-blowing (conditional on own choice of fraud)
Treatment

W-LL-NA
W-HL-NA
W-LL-A
W-HL-A

HIGHS CHOOSING
ZERO FRAUD

HIGHS CHOOSING
POSITIVE FRAUD

LOWS CHOOSING
ZERO FRAUD

% Blowing Whistle % Blowing Whistle % Blowing Whistle
N/A
N/A
2.4%
(N=42)
31.1%
2.8%
41.0%
(N=122)
(N=178)
(N=83)
N/A
N/A
51.1%
(N=47)
22.8%
63.3%
69.4%
(N=79)
(N=221)
(N=36)
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LOWS CHOOSING
POSITIVE FRAUD
% Blowing Whistle
2.9%
(N=558)
2.8%
(N=217)
20.1%
(N=553)
53.8%
(N=264)

Table 14. Whistle-blowing (conditional on other player's fraud)
Treatment

W-LL-NA
W-HL-NA
W-LL-A
W-HL-A

HIGHS – OTHER
PLAYER <= EQUIL.

HIGHS – OTHER
PLAYER > EQUIL.

LOWS – OTHER
PLAYER <= EQUIL.

% Blowing Whistle % Blowing Whistle % Blowing Whistle
N/A
N/A
0.5%
(N=415)
11.8%
32.4%
11.4%
(N=263)
(N=37)
(N=122)
N/A
N/A
19.6%
(N=429)
47.2%
60.8%
60.8%
(N=180)
(N=120)
(N=79)

LOWS – OTHER
PLAYER > EQUIL.
% Blowing Whistle
8.1%
(N=185)
14.6%
(N=178)
29.8%
(N=171)
53.8%
(N=221)

Table 15. Whistle-blowing for low-types
Treatment

Fraud = 0

Fraud = 20

Fraud = 40

Fraud = 60

Fraud = 80

Fraud = 100

W-LL-NA
(N=17)
W-HL-NA
(N=40)
W-LL-A
(N=135)
W-HL-A
(N=167)

1 / 42
(2.4%)
34 / 83
(41.0%)
24 / 47
(51.1%)
25 / 36
(69.4%)

3 / 85
(3.5%)
6 / 101
(5.9%)
20 / 112
(17.9%)
26 / 73
(35.6%)

11 / 288
(3.8%)
0 / 79
(0.0%)
38 / 270
(14.1%)
25 / 71
(35.2%)

1 / 89
(1.1%)
0 / 11
(0.0%)
26 / 102
(25.5%)
29 / 39
(74.4%)

1 / 34
(2.9%)
0/2
(0.0%)
8 / 22
(36.4%)
8 / 12
(66.7%)

0 / 62
(0.0%)
0 / 24
(0.0%)
19 / 47
(40.4%)
54 / 69
(78.3%)

Table 16. Whistle-blowing for high-types
Treatment

Fraud = 0

Fraud = 20

Fraud = 40

Fraud = 60

Fraud = 80

Fraud = 100

W-HL-NA
(N=43)
W-HL-A
(N=158)

38 / 122
(31.1%)
18 / 79
(22.8%)

3 / 79
(3.8%)
35 / 71
(49.3%)

2 / 54
(3.7%)
16 / 26
(61.5%)

0 / 22
(0.0%)
10 / 17
(58.8%)

0 / 11
(0.0%)
12 / 19
(63.2%)

0 / 12
(0.0%)
67 / 88
(76.1%)
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Table 17 presents a regression analysis of the choice to blow the whistle. For robustness, four
specifications are reported. The first contains the treatment variables as well as interactions for if a
manager was a high-type. The second specification also includes risk-posture measures.The third
specification does not include risk-posture, but does include the amount of fraud chosen by each
manager on the team and whether or not penalties (through whistle-blowing or external detection)
were levied in the previous period, as well as the reciprocal of the period as a learning measure. The
fourth specification contains everything in the third, plus risk posture. Following the pattern of previous
discussion, we focus discussion on the fourth specification. The coefficients on the treatment variables
represent the propensity for a risk-neutral low-type manager who has played the game and completed
learning, who has committed zero fraud and has been partnered with someone who has committed
zero fraud, and who did not have the whistle-blown in their group the previous period, to blow the
whistle.

In both LL treatments, the coefficients are not statistically different from zero, as expected. In HL
treatments, there is an underlying 16.7% propensity to blow the whistle when there is no amnesty, and
24.9% propensity to do so when there is. There is no statistically significant difference in the the rate at
which highs choose to blow the whistle in those treatments.

The coefficients on the fraud interactions represent the change in the propensity to blow the
whistle for an increase in one choice of fraud. The choices in the experiment were 0, 20, 40, 60, 80, and
100, so the coefficient represents the marginal change in the willingness to blow the whistle moving
over one of those blocks of 20 units.
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Table 17. OLS Regression (Whistle-blowing)
Predicted Value

Blow Likelihood
Treatment Only

Blow likelihood w/risk

Blow likelihood w/risk and
fraud

Blow likelihood w/risk,
fraud, and time

W_HL_NA

0.000

0.133***
(0.050)

0.107***
(0.038)

0.184**
(0.079)

0.167**
(0.077)

W_LL_NA

0.000

0.028***
(0.008)

0.027***
(0.008)

-0.027
(0.018)

-0.027
(0.019)

W_HL_A

0.000

0.557***
(0.072)

0.594***
(0.079)

0.208
(0.130)

0.249*
(0.145)

W_LL_A

0.000

0.225***
(0.042)

0.229***
(0.055)

0.031
(0.069)

0.036
(0.067)

Ishigh*W_HL_NA

0.000

0.010
(0.062)

0.060**
(0.062)

-0.058
(0.092)

0.001
(0.092)

Ishigh*W_HL_A

0.000

-0.030
(0.091)

-0.102
(0.090)

0.019
(0.161)

-0.034
(0.179)

Fraud*W_HL_NA*20

(-)

-0.086**
(0.033)

-0.078**
(0.033)

Fraud*W_LL_NA*20

(-)

-0.008*
(0.005)

-0.008*
(0.005)

Fraud*W_HL_A*20

(+)

0.062
(0.038)

0.057
(0.037)

Fraud*W_LL_A*20

(+)

0.007
(0.023)

0.008
(0.024)

IsHigh*Fraud*W_HL_NA*20

(-)

-0.001
(0.040)

-0.009
(0.040)

IsHigh*Fraud*W_HL_A*20

(+)

0.028
(0.042)

0.026
(0.041)

Other Fraud*W_HL_NA

(+)

0.021
(0.020)

0.022
(0.020)

Other Fraud*W_LL_NA

(+)

0.034***
(0.012)

0.034***
(0.012)

Other Fraud*W_HL_A

(+)

-0.002
(0.023)

-0.001
(0.023)

*, **, and *** denote parameter is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 17 continued…
Predicted Value

Blow Likelihood
Treatment Only

Blow likelihood w/risk

Blow likelihood w/risk and
fraud

Blow likelihood w/risk,
fraud, and time

Other Fraud*W_LL_A

(+)

0.037
(0.022)

0.037
(0.023)

IsHigh*Other Fraud*W_HL_NA

(+)

0.052*
(0.031)

0.051*
(0.030)

IsHigh*Other Fraud*W_HL_A

(+)

0.009
(0.037)

0.016
(0.038)

Risk Posture *W_HL_NA

(+)

0.039*
(0.021)

0.009
(0.019)

Risk Posture *W_LL_NA

(+)

0.002
(0.005)

0.001
(0.005)

Risk Posture *W_HL_A

(+)

-0.037
(0.034)

-0.025
(0.032)

Risk Posture *W_LL_A

(+)

0.005
(0.037)

-0.010
(0.027)

IsHigh * Risk Posture *W_HL_NA

(-)

-0.058*
(0.034)

-0.037
(0.027)

IsHigh * Risk Posture *W_HL_A

(-)

0.113***
(0.038)

0.086**
(0.037)

Whistle Before*W_HL_NA

0.165***
(0.033)

0.165***
(0.032)

Whistle Before*W_LL_NA

0.038
(0.055)

0.038
(0.055)

Whistle Before*W_HL_A

0.283***
(0.088)

0.274***
(0.077)

Whistle Before*W_LL_A

0.290***
(0.078)

0.290***
(0.078)

IsHigh*Whistle Before*W_HL_NA

-0.107*
(0.062)

-0.116*
(0.057)

IsHigh*Whistle Before*W_HL_A

-0.198**
(0.099)

-0.213**
(0.086)

*, **, and *** denote parameter is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 17 continued
Predicted Value

Blow Likelihood
Treatment Only

Blow likelihood w/risk

Blow likelihood w/risk and
fraud

Blow likelihood w/risk,
fraud, and time

1/P*W_HL_NA

0.008
(0.074)

0.005
(0.073)

1/P*W_LL_NA

-0.034
(0.024)

-0.034
(0.179)

1/P*W_HL_A

0.035
(0.131)

0.032
(0.120)

1/P*W_LL_A

0.010
(0.072)

0.010
(0.072)

IsHigh*1/P*W_HL_NA

-0.013
(0.118)

-0.010
(0.118)

IsHIgh*1/P*W_LL_A

0.056
(0.203)

0.041
(0.197)

F

35.96

22.75

17.42

16.06

R2

0.39

0.41

0.48

0.48

N (observations)
N (subjects)
N (groups)

2400
120
60

2400
120
60

2400
120
60

2400
120
60

*, **, and *** denote parameter is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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As expected, willingness to blow the whistle decreases in the person’s own fraud in the noamnesty treatments, wherein they will be punished for the fraud they were going to commit. The
propensity to blow the whistle increases in the other manager’s fraud, which also makes sense, because
there’s now an incentive to self-report fraud in order to avoid being punished if the other managers in
the group blow the whistle. If the whistle was blown in their group last period, lows increase their rate
of whistle-blowing, even when there is no amnesty, by 16.5 percentage points in the following period.
This can likely be explained, judging from comments made by some of the participants, to be motivated
by spite. In the amnesty treatments, whistle-blowing in the previous period increases whistle-blowing
by roughly 27 percentage points.

Table 18 presents regression results for the high-types only. These can be found using the
interaction effects from Table 17, but are presented here for ease of understanding. Once again, we
restrict discussion to the fourth, fully specified model. The coefficients on the treatment variables
represent the average whistle-blowing of a risk-neutral high-type who has committed no fraud in a
group where the other person has committed no fraud, has played the game an infinite number of
rounds and finished learning, and did not have the whistle-blown in their group in the previous period.

We find that when a manager increases their choice of fraud one increment (a jump of 20), the
propensity to blow the whistle decreases 8.7% in when there is no amnesty, and increases 8.4% when
there is amnesty, which corresponds with the intuition discussed earlier. The propensity to blow the
whistle also rises with increases in the fraud of the other player when there is no amnesty, while it is
statistically insignificant when there is amnesty. Being risk-averse decreases the propensity to blow the
whistle when there is no amnesty, which is unexpected, while it sharply increases the propensity to
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Table 18. OLS Regression (Whistle-blowing: High-types only)
Predicted
Value

Blow Likelihood
Treatment Only

Blow likelihood
w/risk

Blow likelihood
w/risk and fraud

Blow likelihood
w/everything

W_HL_NA

0.000

0.143***
(0.037)

0.168***
(0.050)

0.127**
(0.048)

0.168***
(0.052)

W_HL_A

0.000

0.527***
(0.056)

0.491***
(0.045)

0.227**
(0.099)

0.214*
(0.108)

Fraud*W_HL_NA*20

(-)

-0.084***
(0.023)

-0.087***
(0.024)

Fraud*W_HL_A*20

(+)

0.090***
(0.018)

0.084***
(0.017)

Other Fraud*W_HL_NA

(+)

0.073***
(0.024)

0.074***
(0.023)

Other Fraud*W_HL_A

(+)

0.007
(0.030)

0.015
(0.030)

Risk Averse *W_HL_NA

(+)

-0.019
(0.027)

-0.029
(0.020)

RiskAverse*W_HL_A

(+)

0.076***
(0.018)

0.061***
(0.019)

Whistle Before*W_HL_NA

0.057
(0.053)

0.049
(0.048)

Whistle Before*W_HL_A

0.085*
(0.046)

0.061
(0.040)

1/P*W_HL_NA

-0.005
(0.093)

-0.005
(0.094)

1/P*W_HL_A

0.090
(0.157)

0.072
(0.159)

F
R

2

N (observations)
N (subjects)
N (groups)

51.46

37.37

18.16

19.66

0.43

0.47

0.54

0.55

600
30
30

600
30
30

600
30
30

600
30
30

*, **, and *** denote parameter is statistically different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.
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blow the whistle when there is amnesty – which is not surprising at all. Having had the whistle-blown in
the previous period has no effect on the highs, although it had a substantial effect on the lows.

Conclusion

In this paper, we use data generated by laboratory experiments to test our theory of the
incentives for a managerial team to commit fraud under different policy regimes. By using data collected
in a controlled laboratory setting, we are able to observe decisions to commit fraud whether or not the
fraud is detected, which gives us an important advantage over field data.
Our analysis suggests that these provisions can decrease the total amount of fraud committed
by the team by inducing managers within the team to act as monitoring agents. Although whistleblowing is not predicted to occur in equilibrium, our experimental test finds that whistle-blowing does
occur, as we observe in the real world. If no amnesty is granted to whistle-blowers, we find that both
attempted and effective fraud are reduced from when whistle-blowing is not possible. With amnesty
provisions, we find that the effective fraud is further reduced, but attempted fraud increases. This
indicates that Sarbanes-Oxley could be effective in reducing fraud without costly investment in internal
monitoring if its provisions are adequately enforced, and that amnesty provisions are useful for
maximizing the reduction of fraud that affects markets at the expense of greater prosecutions of
offenders.
The analysis also sheds light on the importance of a managerial team’s composition. The threat
of whistle-blowing has an effect on the level of fraud only when there is sufficient heterogeneity in the
team. Since one can view each managerial hire as a random draw from a pool of applicants, a larger
team is more likely to have at least one manager who is highly sensitive to sanctions and thus willing to
blow the whistle for even minor infractions.
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CHAPTER III: THE EFFECT OF CONTINGENT FEE CAPS ON THE QUALITY OF LEGAL SERVICES
Introduction
In the United States, plaintiffs in civil suits often compensate their attorneys with contingent
fees, so that the attorney is entitled to a share of any awarded damages. The merits of contingent
compensation have been debated for decades, with several states moving to impose limits on
contingent fees even as a number of countries allow them for the first time. Regardless of where one
stands on the issues, there is no doubt as to the economic significance of the market. The market for
legal services is responsible for overseeing the transfer of billions in wealth each year. There are over
1.1 million practicing attorneys in the United States, and one estimate for the total cost of torts
(including incurred damages, defense costs, and administrative expenses) in the U.S. is $252 billion
(Towers Perrin (2008)) for 2007 alone.

Improving the efficiency of this market has thus drawn great interest from academic
economists, who in recent years have argued that contingent fees may improve economic efficiency in
various ways. Supporters of contingent fees point out that that they allow clients with liquidity
constraints access the market for legal services, and that the use of contingent fees shifts the risk to
attorneys who are less risk averse. It has also been argued that contingent fees can improve efficiency
by correcting problems resulting from asymmetric information, ultimately improving the quality of legal
services. This improvement in quality is the focus of this paper.

Previous research has shown that contingent fees can alter the quality of legal services in at
least two ways. The first is by inducing greater effort from attorneys. Danzon (1983) explores the moral
hazard problem that results when attorneys are paid fixed fees rather than contingent fees. Hay (1996)
uses a moral hazard model to analyze the optimal linear contingent fee. He shows that the optimal fee
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will allow attorneys to earn rents and reduce underinvestment of effort in the case. Santore and Viard
(2001) derive the optimal contingent fee in a moral hazard model with non-negative fixed fees and show
that restrictions on fixed fees allow attorneys to earn rents. McKee et. al. (2007) use a series of
economic experiments to test a moral hazard model with contingent compensation and find that clients
are sophisticated enough to use contingent fees to obtain greater effort.

The second way that contingent fees may alter the quality of legal services is by allowing clients
to screen low-quality attorneys. While attorneys may gain a reputation over time, the quality and ability
of any given lawyer is unobservable to potential clients. Contingent fees may provide a mechanism for
revealing the quality of an attorney by allowing contracts that are only profitable to attorneys with a
high likelihood of winning the case.

Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1993) develop a theoretical model wherein clients have information
about the quality of their case that is unobservable to attorneys, while attorneys have information
about their ability that is unobservable to the clients. They find that when case quality is unobservable
by attorneys, a client with a high-quality case will be willing to pay a relatively high fixed fee, and a client
with a relatively low-quality case will be willing to pay a relatively high contingent fee. They also find
that when attorney quality is unobservable to clients, a well-informed high-quality attorney will signal
his or her ability by working for a relatively high contingent fee.

We derive similar results using a model of contingent fee contracts that closely resembles
section four of Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1993), where attorneys are of unobservable quality. An
absence of field data prevents an evaluation of these results using traditional empirical methods, so we
present results from a laboratory experiment designed to test the behavioral hypotheses regarding the
ability of contingent fees to screen low-quality attorneys. As McKee et. al (2007) use experimental
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evidence to provide empirical support for the ability of contingent fees to alleviate the moral-hazard
problems, we use experimental evidence to support the ability of contingent fees to improve average
attorney quality by allowing clients to screen low-quality attorneys.

In addition to testing whether or not clients are sophisticated enough to screen, we address a
current policy debate: whether or not to restrict contingent fees. As of October 2005, 23 states27 limit
contingent fees, with most using a system wherein awards are assigned to brackets akin to the income
tax code. In Illinois, for example, attorney fees are not to exceed 1/3 of the first $150,000, 1/4 of
$150,001 to $1,000,000, and 1/5 of awards over one million dollars.28 The American Bar Association29
opposes these restrictions on grounds that they deny access to representation by those who cannot
afford to pay large fixed fees and reduces the incidence of meritorious claims.

Helland and Tabarrok (2005) examine the effect of contingent fee caps on the legal system. They
find, contrary to arguments frequently made by proponents of tort reform, that caps on contingent fees
are likely to result in more low-value “junk suits” in the legal system. They argue that attorneys have
greater incentive to screen out low-quality cases when they are paid only if they win. Helland and
Tabarrok(2003) use empirical evidence on dropped medical malpractice cases to show that in states
with contingent fee caps, more cases were filed that did not have sufficient merit to proceed all the way
through trial.

While the work of Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1993) allows for unrestricted contracts, we
consider the effect of restrictions on contingent fees on the optimal contract to capture the effects of
legislated contingent fee caps. In theory, restricting contingent fees can prevent screening and reduce
27
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http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/sclaw/statelaws1.htm - National Conference of State Legislatures
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client welfare. However, weak restrictions that should not prevent screening may make screening more
or less difficult in practice. In our laboratory experiments, we institute a cap on the contingent fees that
clients may offer attorneys, and vary that cap across treatments to measure the effect of contingent fee
caps on the ability of clients to screen out low-quality attorneys (and thus increase average attorney
quality) and on client welfare itself. We find that more restrictive contingent fee caps cause a decrease
in a client’s ability to screen low-quality attorneys, the average quality of legal services, and client
welfare even though, in theory, the relatively weak caps used in the experiment should have no effect.

The Model
A risk-averse client with a strictly concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 𝑣(. ),
where 𝑣 ′ (. ) > 0 and 𝑣 ′′ . < 0, wishes to file suit against a third party for exogenous damages, 𝐷. The
case will return an award for damages to the plaintiff, gross of legal fees, of either 𝐷𝐻 or 𝐷𝐿 30, (where
𝐷𝐻 > 𝐷𝐿 ), depending on the outcome. We normalize the client’s income and utility prior to filing the
lawsuit to zero (𝑣 0 = 0).

The client, needing representation, selects at random from 𝐴 risk-neutral attorneys and offers a
contract. This contract consists of a share of the award (contingent fee), 𝑠, and a fixed fee, 𝑓. Each of the
𝐴 attorneys is one of two types, based on his or her ability to win maximum damages from a given case.
There is probability 𝑧 an attorney is a high-ability type (a high) and (1 − 𝑧) probability that an attorney
is a low-ability type (a low), where 0 < 𝑧 < 1. It is assumed that 𝐴 is large enough so that there are
𝑧𝐴 ≥ 1 highs and 1 − 𝑧 𝐴 ≥ 1 lows. Highs have exogenous probability 𝑝𝐻 of winning the case, while
the lows have exogenous probability 𝑝𝐿 , where 1 > 𝑝𝐻 > 𝑝𝐿 > 0. Finally, assume that attorneys have

30

If 𝐷𝐿 = 0 one may interpret the low judgment as “losing” the suit. Similarly, one may interpret the judgment
values as settlement values, with high-ability attorneys being more likely to achieve a large settlement.
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different opportunity costs, 𝑐 𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝐻, 𝐿 of pursuing the case. In subsequent figures and the experiments,
we make the assumption that attorneys of higher quality face higher opportunity costs of accepting a
case, 𝑐 𝐻 ≥ 𝑐 𝐿 . This assumption is not required for our proof of the optimal contract, but is used
because it is the interesting case in which sufficiently low contingent fees will prevent screening of low
quality attorneys. The values of 𝐴, 𝑧, 𝑝𝐻 , 𝑝𝐿 , 𝐷𝐻 , 𝐷𝐿 , 𝑐 𝐻 , and 𝑐 𝐿 are all known to the client.
Furthermore, assume that it is potentially profitable to hire either type of attorney. Mathematically, this
can be stated as: 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝐻 + 1 − 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝐿 ≥ 𝑐 𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝐿, 𝐻,

The timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1: The client chooses a compensation package consisting of a contingent fee, 𝑠, and a
fixed fee, 𝑓, to offer attorneys.
Stage 2: A client offers the contract to a random attorney. The transaction is complete and
binding if the attorney accepts the contract. If the attorney declines to select a contract, the
client searches out another random attorney to offer the contract.31

The offer is binding, so if an attorney chooses to accept, the client hires the attorney. An
attorney will accept the contract it returns expected revenue greater than the attorney’s opportunity
cost.
An attorney of type i who is paid according to contract (𝑠, 𝑓) earns expected profit equal to:
𝐸 𝜋 𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 𝑠𝐷𝐻 + 1 − 𝑝𝑖 𝑠𝐷𝐿 + 𝑓 − 𝑐 𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝐿, 𝐻

31

8

We assume that search for a new attorney is costless, which implies that it is never optimal to offer two distinct
contracts.
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The probability of obtaining a large judgment, 𝑝𝑖 , impacts only the expected award, because the
fixed fee and costs are collected and paid regardless of the outcome of the case. An attorney will accept
a case if his or her expected profit is non-negative.

𝑝𝑖 𝑠𝐷𝐻 + 1 − 𝑝𝑖 𝑠𝐷𝐿 + 𝑓 ≥ 𝑐 𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝐿, 𝐻

9

The risk-averse client wishes to maximize his or her expected utility by acquiring the greatest
probability of winning the case at the least cost. The expected utility is expressed mathematically as:
𝑉 𝑓, 𝑠, 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 𝑣 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐻 − 𝑓 + 1 − 𝑝𝑖 𝑣 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐿 − 𝑓 ,

𝑖 = 𝐿, 𝐻

(10)

To hire an attorney and maximize expected utility, the client should choose a fixed fee and
contingent fee that cause (9) to bind for at least one type of attorney. Offering less profitable contracts
would cause no attorney to be hired, violating our assumption that it is profitable for the client to obtain
representation. Offering more would increase costs with no corresponding benefit, and leave the client
with a profitable deviation in the offered contract. For any two contracts with the same break-even
expected cost, the risk-averse client prefers the one with a higher contingent fee, as a contingent fee is
paid only if the client achieves a high-wealth state (wins the case) and thus insures the client against a
reduction in wealth.32 As such, we find it useful to calculate the break-even simple contingent fee, 𝜍, for
each type.
𝑐𝑖
𝜍 = 𝑖
, 𝑖 = 𝐿, 𝐻
𝑝 𝐷𝐻 + 1 − 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝐿
𝑖

32

(11)

A risk-neutral client would be indifferent between all contracts on the break-even contract line for a high that
screenedthe low.
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Because of differences in the probability of winning between attorneys, it is possible to
construct a compensation package which only one type would accept. The high has a greater probability
of winning the large award than does a low, so even with a higher opportunity cost of taking a case
(𝑐 𝐻 > 𝑐 𝐿 ), it is possible to offer a high a contingent fee contract that the low cannot accept without
losing money. In fact, if 𝑐 𝐻 > 𝑐 𝐿 , 𝜍 𝐻 < 𝜍 𝐿 , and 𝜍 𝐿 < 1, screening the lows requires contingent fees, as
the smallest fixed fee a high would accept would also be accepted by a low (𝑓 = 𝑐 𝐻 > 𝑐 𝐿 ). Similarly,
because the low has a lower opportunity cost of taking the case, there are fixed-fee heavy contracts that
only a low would accept. There are also contracts that neither or both types would choose to accept.
Because we are interested in screening of the lows, this section focuses on the case where 𝜍 𝐻 < 𝜍 𝐿 .
Discussion of the case where 𝜍 𝐿 < 𝜍 𝐻 may be found in Appendix E. Figure 7 presents the zero-profit
lines for high and low-type attorneys, and shows what contracts induce screening of a given type, and
what contracts are acceptable to a given type.
In this paper, we consider legal constraints on the contract a client may offer. The first
constraint is that the fixed fee must be non-negative (𝑓 ≥ 0). The American Bar Association Model Rules
of Professional Conduct prohibit an attorney from purchasing a case from a client. We derive the
optimal contract with this restriction in mind.

Lemma 1: Suppose that 𝜍 𝐻 < 𝜍 𝐿 , then the equilibrium contract is(𝑠 = 𝜍 𝐻 , 𝑓 = 0).

The proof of Lemma 1 is located in Appendix D. The intuition behind the result is
straightforward: A contract with a fixed fee cannot be an equilibrium, because efficient risk sharing
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𝑐𝐻

f

requires that the risk be shifted away from the risk-averse client to the risk-neutral attorney. If
allowable, efficient risk-sharing would suggest that the client will sell the case at a price only the highs
can afford to pay. In this case, the optimal contract would be (𝑠 = 1, 𝑓 = 𝑐𝐻 − 𝑝𝐻 𝐷𝐻 − 1 − 𝑝𝐻 𝐷𝐿 ).
However, as this contract is prohibited by restrictions on negative fixed fees, the closest contract that
would be offered by a fully-informed client is (𝑠 = 𝜍 𝐻 , 𝑓 = 0)33, which is our full-information
competitive benchmark as we examine the effect of contingent fee caps. Formally, we restrict
contingent fees to be no greater than 𝑠 ≤ 1, where 𝑠 is a statutory contingent fee cap placed on the
share of damages an attorney can collect. We wish to characterize the equilibrium contracts offered in
the face of these restrictions.
The optimal contract depends on the values of 𝑧, 𝐴, and 𝑠. When a high-quality attorney can be
obtained for a lower expected cost than a low-quality attorney, it is clearly optimal to offer a contract
that screens out low-ability attorneys. A cap need not have an effect, as long as it remains above the
break-even simple contingent fee for a high, 𝜍 𝐻 . The equilibrium becomes more complicated, however,
if caps are set below the intersection of the break-even contract lines for each type ( 𝑠 <

𝑐 𝐻 −𝑐 𝐿

),

𝑝 𝐻 −𝑝 𝐿 (𝐷𝐻 −𝐷𝐿 )

which prevents screening of the lows. It may be optimal for clients to pool types, or to actually separate
out the lows. Figure 8, restricted to 𝑓 ≥ 0, shows how the characterization of the optimal contract may
change over different values for 𝑠. If caps are high enough, the optimal contract screens the lows. If caps
are sufficiently low, the optimal contract may screen the highs or pool types, depending on the
proportion of each type in the market and their respective opportunity costs and probability of winning
the case .

33

The moral hazard literature reaches the same conclusion, though for different reasons. Santore and Viard
(2001), find that optimal attorney effort will be obtained by allowing attorneys to “buy the case.”.
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Figure 8: Optimal contracts based on contingent fee limits.
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Given a selection of contracts to offer with the same expected payoff, we know from Lemma 1
that a client would prefer the one with the highest contingent fee. This allows us to reduce the
potential contracts a client may offer to three:
1) A separating contract with the highest possible share of compensation derived from the
contingent fee, such that the high-ability attorney breaks even and the low-ability attorney
loses money in expectation.
2) A separating contract with the highest possible share of compensation derived from the
contingent fee, such that the low-ability attorney breaks even and the high-ability attorney
loses money in expectation.
3) A pooling contract with the highest possible share of compensation derived from the
contingent fee, such that the low-ability attorney breaks even and the high-ability attorney
earns rents in expectation.

Proposition 1: Suppose that 𝜍 𝐻 < 𝜍 𝐿 and the contingent fee cap is at least as great as the contingentfee where the break-even contract lines of each type intersect, (𝑠 ≥

𝑐 𝐻 −𝑐 𝐿
),
(𝐷𝐻 −𝐷𝐿 )

𝑝 𝐻 −𝑝 𝐿

the client offers a

contract that screens the low-type attorneys and is given by (𝑠 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑠, 𝜍 𝐻 , 𝑓 = 𝑐 𝐻 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑠𝐷 𝐻 −
1 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑠𝐷𝐿 ).

If 𝑠 > 𝜍 𝐻 , the optimal contract provided in Lemma 1 remains feasible for the client. If the cap
does bind, but it remains possible for the client to screen the lows, then the client offers the contract
that shifts as much risk as possible to the attorney while screening the lows and satisfying the
participation constraint for a high.
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If 𝑠 <

𝑐 𝐻 −𝑐 𝐿
(𝐷𝐻 −𝐷𝐿 )

𝑝 𝐻 −𝑝 𝐿

or 𝜍 𝐻 > 𝜍 𝐿 , screening the lows is not possible. We are most interested in

cases where screening of the lows is possible, so for ease of exposition, analysis of the optimal contract
when lows cannot be screened may be found in Appendix E.

It is straightforward to show that contingent fees improve client welfare by altering the average
quality of attorneys in the market. Assume that contingent fees are prohibited (𝑠 = 0). The client now
has two reasonable choices of contracts: (𝑠 = 0, 𝑓 = 𝑐 𝐻 ) or (𝑠 = 0, 𝑓 = 𝑐 𝐿 ). Choosing the first
contract yields expected utility for the client equal to:
𝐸𝑉 = 𝑧𝑝𝐻 + 1 − 𝑧 𝑝𝐿 𝑣 𝐷𝐻 − 𝑐 𝐻 + 1 − 𝑧𝑝𝐻 + 1 − 𝑧 𝑝𝐿 𝑣 𝐷𝐿 − 𝑐 𝐻

(12)

Choosing the second contract yields the client expected utility of:
𝐸𝑉 = 𝑝𝐿 𝑣 𝐷𝐻 − 𝑐 𝐿 + 1 − 𝑝𝐿 𝑣 𝐷𝐿 − 𝑐 𝐿

13

With no cap on contingent fees, the optimal contract is (𝑠 = 𝜍 𝐻 , 𝑓 = 0), which yields expected utility:
𝐸𝑉 = 𝑝𝐻 𝑣 (1 − 𝜍 𝐻 )𝐷𝐻 + 1 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑣 (1 − 𝜍 𝐻 )𝐷𝐿

(14)

Because (1 − 𝜍 𝐻 )𝐷𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖 − 𝑐 𝐻 , for any 𝑧 < 1, 14 > (12). Our condition that 𝜍 𝐻 < 𝜍 𝐿 , is sufficient
to show that 14 > (13). Thus, clients are better off with contingent fees because, for a contract with
the same cost to the client, the expected probability the hired attorney will win maximum damages is
reduced without contingent fees. 34

The contract used in (12) has the average attorney with a 𝑧𝑝𝐻 + 1 − 𝑧 𝑝𝐿 chance of winning. The contract
used in (13) has the average attorney with a 𝑝𝐿 chance of winning. Both are lower than the contract used in (14)’s
𝑝𝐻 chance of winning.
34
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Experimental Design
We’ve shown that contingent fees may improve the quality of legal services by allowing clients
to screen low-quality attorneys. However, if clients are not sophisticated enough to engage in
screening, this behavior will not be observed in practice. We find that contingent fee caps should not
matter as long as they are set above the break-even simple contingent fee for the highs, but it is
possible a cap which would not change the behavior of a theoretical client will change the behavior of a
human client. For example, by shrinking the set of allowable contracts, clients may have an easier time
solving the game. Conversely, caps may have adverse consequences by functioning as a “focal point”, in
the sense that it may draw a player who does not consciously understand the optimal contract into
making an instinctual out-of-equilibrium decision. In a laboratory setting, we can create a market for
legal services where the quality of an attorney is known, and most variables and parameters can be
controlled for. In this setting we can observe how caps affect actual behavior.

Experimental evidence has been used to examine questions about the compensation of legal
representation in the past. For example, Mckee et. al. (2007) experimentally test a moral hazard model
with contingent compensation and find that clients are sophisticated enough to use contingent fees to
obtain greater attorney effort. Here, we wish to see if clients are sophisticated enough to use
contingent fees to screen low-ability attorneys. For caps that are lower than the break-even simple
contingent fee for the highs, we wish to see to what extent client welfare is reduced. To answer these
questions, we use experimental evidence.

The objective of these experiments is to allow empirical tests of the theoretical propositions put
forth on the effect of contingent fee caps on the ability of clients to screen out low-ability attorneys. We
have established that in theory, contingent fees caps may decrease welfare by forcing risk onto risk71

averse clients, and by reducing the odds of success on meritorious cases. In order to demonstrate the
predictive power of the theory, we use experimental evidence to test our predictions to see if they align
with observed behavior.

In spring of 2009, 90 subjects recruited from the general population at the University of
Tennessee participated in one of 6 experimental sessions conducted at the Experimental Economics
Laboratory. There are two sessions (replications) of each treatment, with N=16 in the first and N=14 in
the second (leading to N=30 per treatment). Average earnings were approximately $20, and sessions
lasted for approximately one hour on average.

Decisions were made via computer. The experiments were programmed and conducted with the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The software collected all decisions and made all relevant earnings
calculations. Written instructions were provided to each participant35 and displayed on-screen. The
experiment moderator read instructions aloud, one screen at a time, and any questions were answered
prior to proceeding to the next instruction screen. During the instructions, participants were asked to
answer two questions on the computer to assess their understanding of how earnings were calculated.
They were unable to proceed until the questions were correctly answered. Those who were unable to
perform the calculations on their own were able to ask an experiment moderator for help, who would
then re-explain procedures and field questions. Following the instructions, there was one unpaid
practice round, where questions were encouraged and addressed. Upon conclusion of the experiment, a
short questionnaire was administered to obtain demographic information and qualitative assessments
of the experiment design and instruction clarity.

35

Instructions and tables given to subjects may be found in Appendices G and H.
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Subjects were informed that they were the manager of a project, and needed to hire a specialist
in order to complete the project and realize revenue (𝐷𝐻 =$100). If the project failed, no revenue was
obtained (𝐷𝐿 =$0). Subjects were given the opportunity to construct a contract to offer specialists,
which consisted of a fixed fee and a share of revenue (contingent fee). It was common knowledge that
there were two types of specialist in the market (Type A and Type B), with different probabilities of
being successful and realizing the revenue (𝑝𝐻 = 0.75, 𝑝𝐿 = 0.25). The proportion of types was also
common knowledge (𝑧 = 0.5), as was the fact that the specialist had to have their costs met in order to
accept the contract, and that the costs for the Type A were higher (𝑐𝐻 = $30, 𝑐𝐿 = $20). The difference
in costs and probabilities of winning provide us with different break-even contingent fees between the
types: (𝜍 𝐻 = 40%, 𝜍 𝐿 = 80%). The three treatments we conduct are identical save for different
maximum contingent fees that could be offered in the contract – to test the effect of contingent fee
caps on behavior. The treatments are described in Table 19.
Subjects would construct the contract and offer it to the market (as search is costless, a
broadcast offer is equivalent in expectation to sequential search with the optimal contract). If no type
could at least break-even, the project did not succeed and returned revenue of $0. If only one type at
least broke-even, then that type was hired and the revenue paid with probability corresponding to the
type hired. The cost of the hire was deducted from the revenue, and the remainder returned to the
subject. If both types at least broke even, the type was chosen by coin-flip . 20 rounds per session were
used, with each round having a new project. After the final round, subjects received their earnings
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Table 19. Contingent Fee Experiment Treatment Descriptions
Treatment Code
Cap25
Cap50
Cap100

Description
The maximum contingent fee that may be offered is 25%.
The maximum contingent fee that may be offered is 50%.
The maximum contingent fee that may be offered is 100%.
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privately and in cash, and left the lab one-by-one without any discussion. Figure 9 shows the break-even
contracts for the two types as well as the congtinency fee caps for the treatments.
In order to investigate the role of risk-attitudes we include in our econometric analysis a risk
measure elicited through a preceding paired lottery-choice procedure as in the previous chapter (e.g.
Holt and Laury(2002)).
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Table 20 presents the results of the risk-elicitation procedure. Risk-neutral and risk-averse clients should
prefer to screen low-ability attorneys at all three caps which are used, so we expect to find no difference
between risk-aversion and risk-neutral risk postures in the analysis.

Results
The equilibrium contract for a risk-averse client is the one with the greatest contingent fee on
the break-even contract line for the high-type attorney. The lowest simple contingent fee that a high will
accept (𝜍 𝐻 ) given our parameters is a 40% rate, which is allowable under both the 50% and 100% caps.
With a cap at 25%, it is still possible to screen the low-types, and the equilibrium contract is a contingent
fee of 25% and a fixed fee of $11.25. Conditional on screening the lows, a risk-neutral client will be
indifferent between any two break-even contracts since they yield they same expected income to the
client.

Table 21 presents the average contract offered by clients in each of the three treatments, and
compares the average to the equilibrium contract for each treatment. A cursory examination of Table 21
shows that clients tended to offer a smaller contingent fee and larger fixed fee than the equilibrium.

Figure 10 presents the movement of expected client and attorney profit over time, as well as
the average contingent and fixed fees offered. The upper-left graph shows the average expected profit
for clients based on the contract they offered over time. Equilibrium contracts yield an expected profit
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Break even contracts for high.
Break even contracts for low.

𝑠=1

𝜍 𝐿 = .80

𝑠 =.50

𝜍 𝐻 = .40

𝑠 =.25

𝑐𝐻 =$30

𝑐𝐿 =$20

Figure 9: Contingent Fee Caps Used in Experimental Design
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Table 20. Parameters and Results of Risk-Elicitation Experiment
Decision
Task

Option A

1

Receive $3.00

Option B

CRRA coefficient of
relative risk
aversion (r)
–

Proportion of
Participants

0% chance of $5.00
0
100% chance of $0.50
2
Receive $3.00
10% chance of $5.00
0
[-, -3.508]
90% chance of $0.50
3
Receive $3.00
20% chance of $5.00
[-3.507, -2.146]
0
80% chance of $0.50
4
Receive $3.00
30% chance of $5.00
[-2.145, -1.336]
0
70% chance of $0.50
5
Receive $3.00
40% chance of $5.00
[-1.335, -.742]
0.033
60% chance of $0.50
6
Receive $3.00
50% chance of $5.00
[-.741, -.250]
0.122
50% chance of $0.50
7
Receive $3.00
60% chance of $5.00
[-.249, .194]
0.189
40% chance of $0.50
8
Receive $3.00
70% chance of $5.00
[.195, .631]
0.356
30% chance of $0.50
9
Receive $3.00
80% chance of $5.00
[.632, 1.112]
0.189
20% chance of $0.50
10
Receive $3.00
90% chance of $5.00
[1.113, 1.758]
0.033
10% chance of $0.50
11
Receive $3.00
100% chance of $5.00
0.044
[1.759, ]
0% chance of $0.50
Notes: The risk coefficient corresponds to an individual that switches from the certain payoff (Option A)
and the uncertain payoff (Option B) at this task. Three individuals accepted the $3.00 certainty
equivalent over a 100% chance of $5.00.
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Table 21. Average Contract Offered
Treatment

Equilibrium Fixed
Fee

Observed Fixed
Fee (last five
rounds)

Equilibrium
Contingent
Percentage

Observed
Contingent
Percentage (last
five rounds)

Cap = 25%

$11.25

$21.26 ($18.39)

25.0%

18.55% (19.43%)

Cap = 50%

$0.00

$14.62 ($12.05)

40.0%

28.30% (29.53%)

Cap = 100%

$0.00

$8.75 ($6.81)

40.0%

33.13% (33.07%)

Figure 10: Expected Profit from Contract and Contract Parameters Over Time
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of $45.00 lab dollars per round. Performance is positively correlated with the size of the cap, with
earnings highest for clients with no cap and lowest with a 25% cap. The upper-right graph shows
expected profit for the attorney over time. In all treatments, attorney profit diminished as the game
proceeded and subjects learned to capture more of the available revenue. Attorney profit is consistently
lowest when there is no cap, and roughly equal when caps are at 50% and 25%. The average fixed fee
fell over time, and was higher in treatments with a lower contingent fee cap. Conversely, contingent
fees rose as the cap rose.

To examine the ability of clients to screen, we analyze the rate at which the lows were screened.
Table 22 shows the rates of screening low type attorneys. The rate at which such screening occurred
was positively related to the size of the cap, and improved over time (an approximately five percentage
point increase in the last five rounds compared to the entire treatment).

A sufficiently risk-loving client may prefer to hire a low-ability attorney, while risk-neutral and
risk-averse clients will always prefer to screen a low-ability attorney. The last two columns of Table 22
show the rates at which people screened the lows based on their risk-posture. The relationship holds
across treatments, but risk-loving clients do tend to screen less. Figure 11 shows the average contracts
offered plotted on the break-even contract lines for each type of attorney. In the Cap25 treatment, the
average contract failed to screen low-ability attorneys. In the Cap50 treatment, the average contract did
not screen low-ability attorneys at first, but did in the last five rounds. In the Cap100 treatment, the
average contract screened low-ability attorneys for the length of the experiment.
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Table 22. Rates of Screening Low-Type
Treatment

Observed
(All Rounds)

Observed
(Last Five Rounds)

Risk-loving
(all rounds)

Cap = 25%

26.83%

31.33%

19.00%

Riskneutral/averse
(all rounds)
28.40%

Cap = 50%

57.67%

62.67%

50.00%

60.00%

Cap = 100%

71.83%

76.67%

50.00%

76.20%
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Cap100 (last 5 rounds)

Cap100 (all rounds)

Cap50 (last 5 rounds)

Cap50 (all rounds)

Cap25 (last 5 rounds)

Cap25 (all rounds)
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𝜍 𝐿 = .80

Break even contracts for low.

𝑠 =.50

𝜍 𝐻 = .40

𝑠 =.25

f
𝑐𝐿 =$20

Figure 11: Average contracts offered by treatment.
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𝑐𝐻 =$30

Figure 12 shows the screening effects of contracts over time in all three treatments. The bottom region
represents the contracts that screen the low type, which again, represents a larger proportion of all
contracts when the cap is higher. The black region represents the contracts that pool types, which are by
far the second most common type. The final graph in the lower right presents the information in Table
22 in visual form.

We now turn to a regression analysis to confirm the graphical analysis. Table 23 presents results
for the probability of screening a low-type. Four specifications are used for robustness. The first
contains only the treatment variables. The second contains the reciprocal of the period, allowing
coefficients on the treatment variables to be interpreted as effects after learning has been completed.
The third contains risk-preferences interacted with the treatment variables, allowing the treatment
coefficients to be interpreted as the decision by a risk-neutral (or possibly unconfused, as James(2007)
finds a correlation between Holt & Laury (2002) performance and confusion) subject. Finally, the fourth
specification contains risk-attitudes and time.

In all specifications, the coefficient on cap25 (a cap of 25%) is significantly lower than the
coefficient on cap100 (a cap of 100%), implying that performance falls dramatically as the cap declines.
The coefficient on cap50 is consistently in between cap25 and cap100, but in the specifications without
risk-preference, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on cap50 is the same of that of
cap100. With risk-preference, we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on cap50 is the same
as that on cap100, but cannot reject the null hypothesis that it is the same as that on cap25. The
negative sign on the reciprocal of the period indicates that subjects do improve over time. Finally, riskneutrality and risk-aversion carry the same effect on two of the three treatments, which supports our
prediction that risk-neutral and risk-averse agents will screen at the same rate.
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Figure 12: Screening Rates for all Treatments
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Table 23. OLS Regression (Probability of Screening Low)
Probability of
Screening Low
Treatment Only

Probability of
Screening Low
Treatment w/Time

Probability of
Screening Low
Treatment w/Risk

Probability of
Screening Low
Treatment w/Risk
and Time

Cap25

0.268***
(0.073)

0.298***
(0.075)

0.187
(0.119)

0.216*
(0.119)

Cap50

0.577***
(0.080)

0.606***
(0.081)

0.517***
(0.187)

0.546***
(0.188)

Cap100

0.718***
(0.071)

0.748***
(0.072)

0.930***
(0.048)

0.960***
(0.049)

RiskAverse * Cap25

0.105
(0.136)

0.105
(0.136)

RiskAverse * Cap50

0.113
(0.213)

0.113
(0.213)

RiskAverse * Cap100

-0.234**
(0.099)

-0.234**
(0.099)

RiskLoving * Cap25

-0.018
(0.163)

-0.018
(0.163)

RiskLoving * Cap50

-0.017
(0.252)

-0.017
(0.252)

RiskLoving * Cap100

-0.384*
(0.195)

-0.384*
(0.195)

1/Period
F
R

2

N (observations)
N (subjects)

-0.163***
(0.047)

-0.163***
(0.047)

55.74

43.48

55.99

50.56

0.58

0.59

0.61

0.61

1800
90

1800
90

1800
90

1800
90
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Risk-loving preferences (and risk-aversion in the cap100 treatment) cause deviations from the screening
rate, which for sufficiently risk-loving behavior would be consistent with theory, although this may be
due to the fact that extreme values in the Holt and Laury (2002) experiment are correlated with
confusion.

Table 24 presents a regression on client performance. The coefficients represent the percentage
of the expected profit from the optimal contract ($45) that was earned. From a client-standpoint,
performance is consistently higher where there is no cap than when the cap is 50%, which is itself higher
than when the cap is at 25%. The same four specifications are used, with the exception being that the
effects of being risk-averse and risk-loving were pooled over the treatments after it was determined
there was no statistically significant difference between the treatment interactions. Being risk-loving
decreases performance, and consistent with previous results, subjects do better over time.

It is precarious to draw too many conclusions about attorney welfare from this analysis,
because the number of cases are held fixed and the analysis assumes that one case is assigned to one
attorney. We find that per-attorney economic profit increases as the cap becomes more strict, which
stands in contrast to ABA opposition to caps, but this is easily explained if the argument that contingent
fees push more cases into the system (either frivolous or from people of reduced means) is true.
Nonetheless, a few insights can be gained from looking closely at the effect of caps on attorney welfare.
First, low-quality attorneys clearly fare better with lower caps. The model suggests that if caps are
sufficiently high, low-quality attorneys are screened and do not serve clients. Lows earn profits if clients
offer pooling contracts or screen the highs, so if caps lead to either type of contract being offered, the
lows benefit. We find that as the cap is decreased, the percentage of pooling contracts increases even
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Table 24. OLS Regression (Client Profit Efficiency)
Client Efficiency
Treatment Only

Client Efficiency
Treatment w/Time

Client Efficiency
Treatment w/Risk

Client Efficiency
Treatment w/Risk
and Time

Cap25

53.57***
(5.10)

57.35***
(5.03)

62.05***
(7.49)

65.83***
(7.39)

Cap50

65.19***
(6.81)

68.97***
(6.81)

73.62***
(8.05)

77.40***
(8.00)

Cap100

78.48***
(5.12)

82.26***
(5.11)

86.05***
(6.11)

89.83***
(6.04)

RiskAverse

-6.79
(6.79)

-6.79
(6.80)

RiskLoving

-19.65**
(9.66)

-19.65**
(9.66)

1/Period

-21.01***
(4.26)

-21.01***
(4.26)

F

145.65

128.61

108.94

108.94

R2

0.76

0.76

0.77

0.77

N (observations)
N (subjects)

1800
90

1800
90

1800
90

1800
90

though we never decreased the cap to the point that pooling contracts or screening the highs was
optimal.

For the high-quality attorneys, we found that when the cap was raised there was an increase
in contracts offered that screened the lows, but clients also became better at capturing the rent. The
effect on total attorney profit was not statistically different between the treatments. Table 25 presents
the aggregate expected profit earned by each type across the different treatments. If the contract
offered by a client screened one type, the other was assumed to accept the contract and the expected
profit was calculated. If the contract offered pooled types, it was assumed there was a 50% chance that
it was accepted by a low-quality attorney and a 50% chance it was accepted by a high-quality attorney ,
since this was the proportion specified in the design. $0 profit was assumed for all other cases. Each cell
contains the number of contracts that screened the other type, and the number of contracts that
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Table 25. Total Profit by Attorney Type by Treatment
Treatment

Cap = 25%

Cap = 50%

Cap = 100%

Total Expected Profit Earned By
High-Quality Attorneys (std. err)

Total Expected Profit Earned By LowQuality Attorneys

S=contracts that screened lows
P=pooling contracts

S=contracts that screened highs
P=pooling contracts

$1,587.10 ($325.05)

$1,934.19 ($338.88)

S = 161
P = 429

S=3
P = 429

$1,985.97 ($517.76)

$1,851.95 ($271.39)

S = 347
P = 233

S=9
P = 233

$1,355.97 ($398.57)

$785.48 ($141.90)

S = 431
P = 156

S=7
P = 156
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pooled types.

We examine the profit earned by individual attorneys in Table 26, which presents attorney
performance over the three treatments. The dependent variable in this case is the economic profit of
the attorney. The same four specifications as before are used. Once risk-preferences are factored in for
the clients, attorney profit is not statistically diferent from zero when the cap is 100%. There is no
stastitically significant difference between earnings when the cap is 25% and when it is 50%. As riskloving behavior seems to be correlated with earning less for clients, the corresponding attorneys earn
more.

Conclusion
The public debate over tort reform has focused on whether or not caps on contingent fees
reduce frivolous lawsuits or reduce access to legal representation for the poor. Economists have added
to the debate by arguing that contingent fees may improve the quality of legal services by inducing
greater attorney effort and by allowing clients to screen low-quality attorneys. Unfortunately, there is
limited field data available to test whether clients are sophisticated enough to use contingent fees in the
manner predicted by theory. We attempt to fill this gap in the literature with data derived from
controlled laboratory experiments.

In this paper, we use an adverse selection mode to examine the effect of contingent fee caps on
the contracts will be offered by clients. We find that stringent caps may reduce the average quality of
legal representation by preventing the screening of low-quality attorneys. Using an experimental design,
we also show that while clients are sophisticated enough to use contingent fees to screen low-ability
attorneys, they are less likely to succeed at doing so with stringent caps on contingent fees – even if the
caps should not, in theory, prevent screening. If clients do not screen low-quality attorneys, they
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Table 26. OLS Regression (Attorney Economic Profit)
Attorney Economic
Profit
Treatment Only

Attorney Economic
Profit
Treatment w/Time

Attorney Economic
Profit
Treatment w/Risk

Attorney Economic
Profit
Treatment w/Risk
and Time

Cap25

5.86***
(1.18)

4.82***
(1.11)

3.73**
(1.59)

2.68*
(1.53)

Cap50

6.40***
(1.62)

5.35***
(1.65)

4.38***
(1.64)

3.33**
(1.65)

Cap100

3.57***
(0.98)

2.52**
(0.94)

1.69
(1.14)

0.64
(1.08)

RiskAverse

1.91
(1.36)

1.91
(1.36)

RiskLoving

4.04*
(2.39)

4.03*
(2.39)

1/Period
F
R

2

N (observations)
N (subjects)

5.82***
(1.42)

5.82***
(1.42)

17.56

14.11

11.42

9.75

0.25

0.26

0.26

0.27

1800
90

1800
90

1800
90

1800
90
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typically offer a pooling contract, allowing low-quality attorneys to serve clients and reducing the
average quality of attorneys in the market. As a result, client welfare is decreased with restrictive caps.

91

LIST OF REFERENCES

92

Akerlof, George A. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism."
Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (August 1970): 488-500.
Alexander, Cindy R., and Kathleen Weiss. "Regulatory Monitoring Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act." SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1022161, October 2007.
American Bar Association, Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section - Task Force on Contingent Fees.
Report on Contingent Fees in Medical Malpractice Litigation. September 20, 2004.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Management Override of Internal Controls: The
Achilles' Heel of Fraud Prevention. New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc.,
2005.
Andergassen, Rainer. "High-powered incentives and fraudulent behavior: Stock-based versus stock
option-based compensation." Economics Letters 101, no. 2 (2008): 122-125.
Andreoni, James. "Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?" American
Economic Review 85 (1995): 891-904.
Apesteguia, Jose, Martin Dufwenberg, and Reinhard Selten. "Blowing the Whistle." Economic Theory 31
(2007): 143-166.
Bar-Gill, Oren, and Lucian Arye Bebchuk. "Misreporting Corporate Performance." SSRN Working Paper,
2003.
Bergstresser, D., and Philippon. "CEO Incentives and Earnings Management: Evidence from the 1990s."
Journal of Financial Economics - forthcoming, 2005.
Bruner, David, Michael McKee, and Rudy Anthony Santore. "Hand in the Cookie Jar: An Experimental
Investigation of Equity-based Compensation and Managerial Fraud." Southern Journal of Economics
forthcoming (2008).
Burns, Natasha, and Simi Kedia. "The Impact of Performance Based Compensation on Misreporting."
Journal of Financial Economics 79 (2006): 35-67.
Camerer, Colin. "Individual Decision Making." In Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by John H
Kagel and Alvin E Roth, 587-703. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Chan, Kenneth, Rob Godby, Stuart Mestelman, and R. Andrew Muller. "Boundary Effects and Voluntary
Contributions to Public Goods." McMaster University Department of Economics Working Paper 94-03,
1994.
Cheng, Qiang, and Terry Warfield. "Equity Incentives and Earnings Management." The Accounting
Review (University of British Columbia and University of Wisconsin) 80, no. 2 (April 2005): 441-476.
93

Cooter, Robert, and Ariel Porat. "Should Courts Deduct Non-Legal Sanctions from Damages?" Journal of
Legal Studies 30 (2001): 401-422.
Crocker, Keith J., and Joel Slemrod. "The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and Managerial
Compensation." RAND Journal of Economics 38, no. 3 (2007): 698-713.
Danzon, Patricia M. "Contingency Fees for Personal Injury Litigation." Bell Journal of Economics 18
(1983): 213-224.
Davis, Douglas D, and Charles A Holt. Experimental Economics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1992.
Dickinson, David L. "The Effects of Beliefs Versus Risk Attitude on Bargaining Outcomes." Theory and
Decision 1 (2009): 69-101.
Evans, Mary, Christian Vossler, and Nicholas Flores. "Hybrid Allocation Mechanisms for Publically
Provided Goods." Journal of Public Economics, no. 93 (2009): 311-325.
Fischbacher, Urs. "z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments." Experimental
Economics 10, no. 2 (2007): 171-178.
Friebel, Guido, and Sergei Guriev. "Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms." EFA 2005 Moscow
Meetings Paper Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=637221, 29 October 2005.
Gangadharan, Lata, and Veronika Nemes. "Experimental Analysis of Risk and Uncertainty in Provisioning
Private and Public Goods." Economic Inquiry 47, no. 1 (2009): 146-164.
Goldman, Eitan, and Steve L. Slezak. "An Equilibrium Model of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of
Information Manipulation." Journal of Financial Economics, 2006.
Harrison, Glenn W, John A List, and Charles Towe. "Naturally Occurring Preferences and Exogenous
Laboratory Experiments: A Case Study of Risk Aversion." Econometrica 109, no. 2 (2007): 341-368.
Hay, Bruce L. "Contingent Fees and Agency Costs." The Journal of Legal Studies 25, no. 2 (June 1996):
503-533.
Helland, Eric, and Alexander Tabarrok. "Contingency Fees, Settlement Delay, and Low-Quality Litigation:
Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 19 (2003): 517542.
—. Two Cheers for Contingent Fees. AEI Press, American Enterprise Institute, 2005.
Heyes, Anthony, and Sandeep Kapur. "An Economic Model of Whistle-Blower Policy." Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization Advance Access, January 2008.
94

Holmstrom, Bengt. "Moral Hazard in Teams." The Bell Journal of Economics 13, no. 2 (Autumn 1982):
324-340.
Holt, Charles A, and Susan K Laury. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects." American Economic Review 92,
no. 5 (2002): 1644-1655.
James, Duncan. "Stability of risk preference parameter estimates within the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
procedure." Experimental Economics 10, no. 2 (2007): 123-141.
Johnson, Shane A., Harley E. Ryan, and Yisong S. Tian. "Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The
Sources of Incentives Matter." SSRN - http://ssrn.com/abstract=395960, July 13, 2006.
Ke, Bin. "Do Equity-Based Incentives Induce CEOs to Manage Earnings to Report Strings of Consecutive
Earnings Increases?" Pennsylvania State University Working Paper, 2005.
McKee, Michael J, Rudy Anthony Santore, and Joel Shelton. "Contingency Fees, Moral Hazard, and
Attorney Rents: A Laboratory Experiment." Journal of Legal Studies, June 2007: 253-274.
Mittendorf, Brian. "Infectious Ethics: How Upright Employees Can Ease Concerns of Tacit Collusion."
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 24 (October 2008): 356-370.
Murphy, Kevin. "Executive Compensation." Handbook of Labor Economics, 1999.
Peng, Lin, and Ailsa A. Roell. "Executive Pay, Earnings Manipulation and Shareholder Litigation." Journal
of Finance (forthcoming), August 2006.
Richardson, Scott A., A. Irem Tuna, and Min Wu. "Predicting Earnings Management: The Case of Earnings
Restatements." University of Pennsylvania, Working Paper, 2002.
Robison, H. David, and Rudy Anthony Santore. "Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud." Working
Paper, 2008.
Rubinfeld, Daniel L., and Susan Scotchmer. "Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Economic Analysis."
RAND Journal of Economics 24 (1993): 343-356.
Santore, Rudy, and Alan Viard. "Legal Fee Restrictions, Moral Hazard, and Attorney Rents." The Journal
of Law and Economics 44, no. 2 (2001): 549-572.
Schmidt, Matthias. ""Whistle Blowing" Regulation and Accounting Standards Enforcement in Germany
and Europe - An Economic Perspective." International Review of Law and Economics 25 (2005): 143-168.
Shearer, Bruce, and Charles Bellemare. "Sorting, Incentives and Risk Preferences: Evidence from a Field
Experiment." IZA Discussion Paper No. 2227, July 2006.

95

Towers Perrin. "2008 Update on U.S. Tort Cost Trends." 2008.
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=USA/2008/200811/2008_tort_costs_trends.p
df (accessed June 03, 2009).
United States of America v. Bernard J. Ebbers. 2002CR1144 (United States District Court - Southern
District of New York).
United States of America v. Kenneth L. Lay & Jeffrey K. Skilling. 2004CR00025 (United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas - Houston Division).
Watnick, Valerie J. "Whistleblower Protections under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Primer and a Critique."
bepress Legal Series Working Paper 1822 (October 2006): http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1822.

96

APPENDICES

97

Appendix A: Proofs from Chapter I
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose, to the contrary, that 𝐹 ∗ > 0 is the equilibrium level of fraud and that some
manager finds it optimal to blow the whistle. In this case, a manager who chooses a positive level of
fraud receives no benefit from fraud and pays a penalty with certainty (recall equation 1). Thus, any
manager committing positive fraud would have a profitable deviation because this manager would be
better off committing zero fraud, contradicting the assumption of equilibrium. ∎
Proof of Lemma 2: Define 𝑍(𝐹) =

𝛼
𝐹
𝑁

− 𝜂𝑡 𝜌𝑋

𝑍(𝐹) + 𝜂𝑡 1 − 𝜃 𝑋 𝑓𝑡𝑖 = 0,

𝐹
𝑁

and rewrite (5) as

𝑡 = 𝐿, 𝐻

(𝐴1)

Now observe that the first and second derivatives of 𝑍(𝐹) are the expressions in (2) and (3). It follows
that 𝑍(𝐹) is concave, achieves a maximum at 𝐹 = 𝑃𝑡 , and is positive at all 𝐹 ≤ 𝑃𝑡 . Since the term
𝜂𝑡 1 − 𝜃 𝑋 𝑓𝑡𝑖 in (5’) is non-negative at all 𝑓𝑡𝑖 ≥ 0, the solution to (A1) must occur at 𝐹 > 𝑃𝑡 for all
𝑓𝑡𝑖 ≥ 0. ∎
Proof of Lemma 3: Implicit differentiation of (3) yields
′ 𝐹
𝜕𝑃𝑡 −𝑁𝑋 𝑁
=
𝐹
𝜕𝜂𝑡
𝜂𝑡 𝑋 ′′ 𝑁

< 0,

𝑡 = 𝐿, 𝐻

(𝐴2)

where the sign follows from 𝑋 ′ > 0, 𝑋 ′′ > 0. Since 𝜂𝐻 > 𝜂𝐿 , we have 𝑃𝐻 < 𝑃𝐿 . ∎
Proof of Lemma 4: Suppose, to the contrary, that for some type t we have 𝐹 ∗ > 𝑃𝑡 and 𝑓𝑡∗ > 0. This
cannot be an equilibrium because a manager of type 𝑡 could increase his or her payoff by choosing a
lower level of fraud. ∎

The next two Lemmas are not stated in the text but are used by Proposition 1.
Lemma 5: There does not exist an equilibrium in which 𝐹 ∗ < 𝑀𝑖𝑛{𝑃𝐿 , 𝑊 𝐻 0 }.
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Proof of Lemma 5: Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists an equilibrium in which
𝐹 ∗ < 𝑀𝑖𝑛{𝑃𝐿 , 𝑊 𝐻 0 }. First, observe that for any 𝐹′ < 𝑀𝑖𝑛{𝑃𝐿 , 𝑊 𝐻 0 } neither type wishes to blow
the whistle since 𝐹 ′ < 𝑊 𝐻 0 ≤ 𝑊 𝐻 𝑓𝐻∗ and 𝐹′ < 𝑃𝐿 < 𝑊 𝐿 0 ≤ 𝑊 𝐿 𝑓𝐿∗ . Second, observe that at
any 𝐹 ∗ < 𝑃𝐿 , a low would prefer to increase his or her chosen level of fraud to 𝑓 ′ = 𝑓𝐿∗ + 𝜀 where
0 < 𝜀 ≤ 𝑃𝐿 − 𝐹 ∗ as long as doing so does not cause some manager to blow the whistle. However, it has
already been shown that no manager will blow the whistle as long as 𝐹 ∗ + 𝜀 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛{𝑃𝐿 , 𝑊 𝐻 0 } . It
follows that a low could increase his or her payoff by increasing his or her level of fraud by some small 𝜀
without inducing whistle-blowing, contradicting the assumption of equilibrium. ∎
Lemma 6: There does not exist an equilibrium in which 𝐹 ∗ > 𝑀𝑖𝑛{𝑃𝐿 , 𝑊 𝐻 0 } .
Proof of Lemma 6: First, consider the case in which𝑃𝐿 ≤ 𝑊 𝐻 (0) and suppose, to the contrary, that
there exists an equilibrium in which 𝐹 ∗ > 𝑃𝐿 . By Lemmas 3 and 4 we must have 𝑓𝐿∗ = 𝑓𝐻∗ = 0, which
contradicts the supposition that 𝐹 ∗ > 𝑃𝐿 . Second, consider the case in which 𝑃𝐿 > 𝑊 𝐻 (0) and
suppose, to the contrary, that there exists an equilibrium in which 𝐹 ∗ > 𝑊 𝐻 (0). By Lemma 2 we have
𝐹 ∗ > 𝑃𝐻 which, along with Lemma 4, implies 𝑓𝐻∗ = 0. Thus, a high who has not committed fraud would
blow the whistle since 𝐹 ∗ > 𝑊 𝐻 (0). However, from Lemma 1 we know that we cannot have an
equilibrium in which a manager blows the whistle. ∎
Proof of Proposition 1: By Lemma 5 we have 𝐹 ∗ ≤ 𝑃𝐿 . Lemmas 2 and 6 imply 𝑃𝐻 < 𝐹 ∗. By Lemma 4,
𝑃𝐻 < 𝐹 ∗ implies 𝑓𝐻∗ = 0. Therefore, we must have 𝑓𝐿∗ > 0. There are now two mutually exclusive cases
to consider.
The first case is when 𝑃𝐿 ≤ 𝑊 𝐻 (0). Here we have 𝐹 ∗ = 𝑃𝐿 , 𝑓𝐻∗ = 0 and 𝑓𝐿∗ =

𝑃𝐿
𝑁𝐿

. The highs do not have

a profitable deviation because 𝐹 ∗ > 𝑃𝐻 , implying that any increase in fraud would necessarily reduce a
high’s utility. Lows do not have a profitable deviation because 𝑃𝐿 is defined as the level of fraud that
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maximizes their utility, so any change in fraud causes a decrease in utility for a low. (2) is not satisfied
strictly for either type so whistle-blowing does not occur. Thus, each manager’s actions are a bestresponse to those of other managers.
The second case is when 𝑃𝐿 > 𝑊 𝐻 (0). Here we have 𝐹 ∗ = 𝑊 𝐻 (0), 𝑓𝐻∗ = 0 and 𝑓𝐿∗ =

𝑊 𝐻 (0)
.
𝑁𝐿

The highs

do not have a profitable deviation because 𝐹 ∗ > 𝑃𝐻 , implying that any increase in fraud would reduce
utility for the highs. A low does not have a profitable deviation to reduce fraud because the level of
fraud is below the preferred level for a low, nor does a low have a profitable deviation to increase fraud
because that would cause whistle-blowing. (2) is not satisfied strictly for either type, so whistle-blowing
does not occur. Thus each manager’s actions are a best-response to those of other managers. ∎
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) To start, hold 𝜂𝐻 fixed, so that 𝑊 𝐻 0 remains fixed. By Proposition 1,
𝑊 𝐻 0 > 𝑃𝐿 implies 𝐹 ∗ = 𝑃𝐿 , so we need to show that for 𝜂𝐿 sufficiently close to 𝜂𝐻 we must have
𝑊 𝐻 0 > 𝑃𝐿 . First, equation (3) allows us to write 𝑃𝐿 as a function of 𝜂𝐿 so we can write 𝑃𝐿 (𝜂𝐿 ). It
follows by inspection that 𝑃𝐿 (𝜂𝐻 ) = 𝑃𝐻 . By Lemma 2 and the fact that 𝑃𝐿 (𝜂𝐻 ) = 𝑃𝐻 we have
𝑃𝐿 𝜂𝐻 < 𝑊 𝐻 0 . It thus follows from the fact that 𝑊 𝐻 0 is independent of 𝜂𝐿 and the continuity of
𝑃𝐿 () that for 𝜂𝐿 sufficiently close to 𝜂𝐻 we must have 𝑃𝐿 (𝜂𝐿 ) < 𝑊 𝐻 0 .
(ii) To start, hold 𝜂𝐿 fixed, so that 𝑃𝐿 remains fixed. By Proposition 1, 𝑊 𝐻 0 < 𝑃𝐿 implies 𝐹 ∗ = 𝑊 𝐻 0 ,
so it is sufficient to show that as 𝜂𝐻 → ∞ we have 𝑊 𝐻 0 → 0. By definition, 𝑊 𝐻 0 is implicitly
defined by (5)

when 𝑓𝐻∗

= 0, which can be rearranged to yield

𝛼
𝜌𝑁 𝜂 𝐻

=

𝑊 𝐻 (0)
𝑁
𝑊𝐻 0

𝑋

.

The limit of the left hand side of this expression goes to zero as 𝜂𝐻 → ∞, so we need to show that as
𝑊 𝐻 0 → 0 the limit of the right hand side of the expression goes to zero. Since 𝑋 0 = 0, we need to
apply L’Hospital’s rule. Taking the derivative of the numerator and denominator with respect to 𝑊 𝐻 0
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yields

𝑋′

𝑊 𝐻 (0)
𝑁

𝑁

. Now using the fact that 𝑋 ′ 0 = 0, it follows that as 𝑊 𝐻 0 → 0 the right hand side of

the expression goes to zero. It follows that for any 𝜂𝐿 > 0 there exists a 𝜂𝐻 such that 𝑊 𝐻 0 < 𝑃𝐿 . ∎
Proof of Proposition 3: From Proposition 1, we know that 𝐹 ∗ = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝐿 , 𝑊 𝐻 (0) . It is therefore
sufficient to show that neither 𝑃𝐿 nor 𝑊 𝐻 (0) depend on 𝜃. Equation (3) implies that 𝑃𝐿 is independent
of 𝜃. From (5) it follows that 𝑊 𝐻 (0) solves

𝛼
𝐹
𝑁

− 𝜌𝜂𝑡 𝑋

𝐹
𝑁

= 0, which is independent of 𝜃. ∎

Proof of Proposition 4: That (8) must be satisfied for every manager follows from the discussion in the
text. Now observe that the marginal product of effort for any given manager,

𝛼 ′
𝑣
𝑁

𝑒𝑖 + 𝐸−𝑖 , depends

only on team effort. Therefore, in equilibrium, we must have 𝐶 ′ 𝑒𝑖 ∗ = 𝐶 ′ 𝑒𝑗 ∗ which implies 𝑒𝑖 ∗ = 𝑒𝑗 ∗
since the marginal cost of effort is strictly increasing.
Proof of Proposition 5: Differentiating (8) we can calculate the change in the equilibrium effort for one
manager
𝑣 ′ (𝑁𝑒 ∗ )
𝑑𝑒 ∗
𝑁
= −
𝑑𝛼
𝛼𝑣′′ 𝑁𝑒 ∗ − 𝐶′′ 𝑒 ∗

(𝐴3)

So the change in team effort is
𝑑(𝑁𝑒 ∗ )
𝑣 ′ 𝑁𝑒 ∗
=−
𝑑𝛼
𝛼𝑣′′ 𝑁𝑒 ∗ − 𝐶′′ 𝑒 ∗

>0

(𝐴4)

where the sign of the above follows from 𝑣 ′ > 0, 𝑣 ′′ < 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶 ′′ > 0. ∎
Proof of Proposition 6: We first show the effect of a change in equity compensation. From Proposition 1,
we know that 𝐹 ∗ = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝐿 , 𝑊 𝐻 (0) . We show that increasing equity compensation will increase both
the preferred level of the fraud for the lows and the level that triggers whistle-blowing.
To calculate the change in 𝑊 𝐻 (0), the whistle-blowing condition resulting from a change in equity,
differentiate (5) evaluated at 𝑓𝐻∗ = 0 with respect to 𝐹 and 𝛼 to get:
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𝑊 𝐻 (0)
− 𝑁
𝜕𝑊 𝐻 (0)
=
𝑊𝐻 (0)
𝛼 𝜂𝐻 𝜌
𝜕𝛼
−
𝑋′
𝑁
𝑁
𝑁

(𝐴5)

Using arguments similar to those in the proof of Lemma 2, it is straightforward to show that the
denominator of (A5) is negative. It follows that

𝜕𝑊 𝐻 (0)
𝜕𝛼

> 0.

To calculate the change in 𝑃𝐿 resulting from a change in the share of equity, differentiate (3) with
respect to 𝐹 and 𝛼 to get:
𝜕𝑃𝐿
𝑁
=
>0
𝜕𝛼
𝜌𝜂𝐿 𝑋 ′′ 𝐹

𝐴6

where the sign follows immediately from 𝑋 ′′ > 0.
We next show the effect of a change in the probability of detection. From Proposition 1, we know that
𝐹 ∗ = 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝐿 , 𝑊 𝐻 (0) . We show that increasing the probability of detection will decrease both the
preferred level of the fraud for the lows and the level that triggers whistle-blowing.
Implicit differentiation of (3) yields
′ 𝐹
𝜕𝑃𝐿 −𝑁𝑋 𝑁
=
< 0,
𝐹
𝜕𝜌
𝜌𝑋 ′′
𝑁

𝑡 = 𝐿, 𝐻

(𝐴7)

where the sign follows from 𝑋 ′ > 0, 𝑋 ′′ > 0.
To calculate the change in 𝑊 𝐻 (0), resulting from a change in the probability of detection, differentiate
(5) evaluated at 𝑓𝐻∗ = 0 with respect to 𝐹 and 𝜌 to get:
𝑊 𝐻 (0)
𝜕𝑊 (0)
𝑁
=
𝛼 𝜂𝐻 𝜌 ′ 𝑊𝐻 (0)
𝜕𝜌
𝑁− 𝑁 𝑋
𝑁
𝐻

𝜂𝐻 𝑋

(𝐴8)

Using arguments similar to those in the proof of Lemma 2, it is straightforward to show that the
denominator of (A8) is negative. It follows that

𝜕𝑊 𝐻 (0)
𝜕𝜌
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< 0. ∎

Appendix B: Payoff Tables Given To Subjects in Fraud Experiment

Table provided in W-HL-A and NW-HL-NA
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Table provided in W-HL-NA
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Table Provided in W-HL-A
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Table provided in W-LL-NA
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Table provided in W-LL-A and NW-LL-NA
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Table provided in W-LL-A
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Appendix C: Screenshots/Instructions for Fraud Experiment

Screen 1: Risk Elicitation Mechanism

Screen 2: Introduction Screen (common to all treatments)
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Screen 3: Groups (Single Type: W-LL-NA, W-LL-A, NW-LL-NA)
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Screen 3: Groups (Two Types: W-HL-NA, W-HL-A, NW-HL-NA)

Screen 4: The Game (Single Type: W-LL-NA, W-LL-A, NW-LL-NA)

111

Screen 4: The Game (Two Types: W-HL-NA, W-HL-A, NW-HL-NA)

Screen 5: Reported and True Value (same for all treatments)
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Screen 6: Subjects create their own example. (same for all treatments)

Screen 7: Results of example creation (W-LL-NA, W-LL-A, NW-LL-NA)
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Screen 7: Results of example creation (W-HL-NA, W-HL-A, NW-HL-NA)

Screen 8: Description of whistle-blowing (W-LL-NA)
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Screen 8: Description of whistle-blowing (W-LL-A)

Screen 8: Description of whistle-blowing (W-HL-NA)
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Screen 8: Description of whistle-blowing (W-HL-A)

Screen 9: Question of understanding about whistle-blowing (W-LL-NA, W-LL-A)
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Screen 9: Question of understanding about whistle-blowing (W-HL-NA, W-HL-A)

Screen 10: Description of the external penalty (W-LL-NA, W-LL-A)
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Screen 10: Description of the external penalty (W-HL-NA, W-HL-A)

Screen 10: Description of the external penalty (NW-LL-NA)
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Screen 10: Description of the external penalty (NW-HL-NA)

Screen 11: Question of understanding about the external penalty (W-LL-NA, W-LL-A, NW-LL-NA)
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Screen 11: Question of understanding about the external penalty (W-HL-NA, W-HL-A, NW-HL-NA)

Screen 12: Example of payoff calculations (W-LL-NA)
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Screen 12: Example of payoff calculations (W-LL-A)

Screen 12: Example of payoff calculations (NW-LL-NA)
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Screen 12: Example of payoff calculations (W-HL-NA)

Screen 12: Example of payoff calculations (W-HL-A)
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Screen 12: Example of payoff calculations (NW-HL-NA)

Screen 13: Summary (W-LL-NA)
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Screen 13: Summary (W-LL-A)

Screen 13: Summary (NW-LL-NA)
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Screen 13: Summary (W-HL-NA)

Screen 13: Summary (W-HL-A)
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Screen 13: Summary (NW-HL-NA)

Screen 14: Fraud decision screen.
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Screen 14: Fraud decision screen.

Screen 14: Fraud decision screen.
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Screen 15: Whistle-blowing decision screen.

Screen 15: Whistle-blowing decision screen. (W-LL-A, W-HL-A)
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Screen 15: Replacement for whistle-blowing screen in NW treatments (NW-LL-NA, NW-HL-NA)

Screen 16: Detection results (whistle was blown)
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Screen 16: Detection results (external detection)

Screen 16: Detection results (W-LL-NA, W-LL-A, W-HL-NA, W-LL-A) In the NW treatments, the line “No
manager prevented deviation” is deleted.
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Screen 17: Payoff screen (whistle was blown)

Screen 17: Payoff screen (external detection)
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Screen 17: Payoff screen (no detection)

Screen 17: Payoff screen (blew whistle with amnesty)
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Screen 18: Risk-elicitation mechanism results

Screen 19: Questionnaire
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Appendix D: Proofs from Chapter III
Proof of Lemma 1:
We need to show that the client’s optimal contract is (𝑠 = 𝜍 𝐻 , 𝑓 = 0).

First, it is straightforward to show that no separating or pooling contract can exist in equilibrium that
does not lie on the break-even line for at least one type of attorney. A contract that causes both types
of attorney to earn positive economic profits cannot be an equilibrium, because the client can offer
slightly less and still hire the same type of attorney for the same result at less cost. A contract that
causes neither type to at least break-even cannot be an equilibrium, because of the assumption that it is
optimal to hire an attorney.

Second, we show that clients will not offer fixed fees.

Recall the iso-profit line for an attorney:
𝐸 𝜋 𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 𝑠𝐷𝐻 + 1 − 𝑝𝑖 𝑠𝐷𝐿 + 𝑓 − 𝑐 𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝐿, 𝐻
We calculate the slope of the attorney’s iso-profit line,

𝑑𝑠
,
𝑑𝑓

8

by totally differentiating (8) with respect to 𝑠

and 𝑓.
𝑑𝑠
1
= 𝑖
𝑑𝑓 𝑝 𝐷𝐻 + 1 − 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝐿

(𝐴9)

Recall the client’s expected utility function:
𝑉 𝑓, 𝑠, 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑖 𝑣 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐻 − 𝑓 + 1 − 𝑝𝑖 𝑣 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐿 − 𝑓 ,
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𝑖 = 𝐿, 𝐻

(10)

We calculate the slope of a client’s indifference curve,

𝑑𝑠
,
𝑑𝑓

by totally differentiating (10) with respect to 𝑠

and 𝑓.
𝑑𝑠
𝑝𝑖 𝑣 ′ 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐻 − 𝑓 + 1 − 𝑝𝑖 𝑣 ′ ( 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐿 − 𝑓)
=−
𝑑𝑓
𝐷𝐻 𝑝𝑖 𝑣 ′ 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐻 − 𝑓 + 𝐷𝐿 1 − 𝑝𝑖 𝑣 ′ ( 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐿 − 𝑓)

(𝐴10)

Then, using the concavity of 𝑣(. ), it is straightforward to show that
𝑑𝑠
>
𝑑𝑓

𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝐻

1
+ 1 − 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝐿

𝑖𝑓 𝑠 < 1

(𝐴11)

𝑑𝑠
=
𝑑𝑓

𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝐻

1
+ 1 − 𝑝𝑖 𝐷𝐿

𝑖𝑓 𝑠 = 1

(𝐴12)

Thus, the indifference curve of a consumer who wins with probability 𝑝𝑖 has a steeper slope than that of
an attorney who wins with probability 𝑝𝑖 , except at a full insurance contract (i.e., 𝑠 = 1), in which case,
the two slopes are equal.

Figure 13 depicts an indifference curve for a client who hires an attorney of type 𝑖 as well as iso-profit
margin lines for an attorney of type 𝑖. For any contract with a positive fixed fee, there exists a simple
contingent fee that yields greater expected utility to the client and greater expected profit to the
attorney. Simple contingent fees are less efficient than allowing the attorney to purchase the case,
which would shift all risk to the risk-neutral attorney. However, as discussed, attorneys may not charge a
negative fixed fee. Consequently, simple contingent fees are the most efficient fee structure that are
permissible.
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s
Iso-profit margin lines.
Indifference curve for client.

100%

More efficient than(𝑠, 𝑓)
(𝑠, 𝑓)

Slope =

1
𝑝 𝑖 𝐷𝐻 + 1−𝑝 𝑖 𝐷𝐿

f

0
Figure 13: Contingent fees are the most efficient form of contract
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Finally, having shown that it is optimal for the client to offer a simple contingent fee, we show that a
client should offer the break-even simple contingent fee for the high type.
For any contingent fees 𝑠 and 𝑠 ′ < 𝑠, from (10) it must be true that 𝑉 0, 𝑠′, 𝑝𝐻 < 𝑉 0, 𝑠, 𝑝𝐻 <
𝑉 0, 𝑠, 𝑝𝐿 .

Therefore, from the assumption that 𝜍 𝐻 < 𝜍 𝐿 , the optimal contract is 𝑠 = 𝜍 𝐻 , 𝑓 = 0. ∎
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Appendix E: Discussion of the Optimal Contract When Screening the Lows is Not Possible.
If 𝜍 𝐿 < 𝜍 𝐻 , screening the low is not possible with any contingent fee. Also, if To examine 𝜍 𝐻 < 𝜍 𝐿 , but
𝑐 𝐻 > 𝑐 𝐿 ,the break-even iso-profit lines for both types intersect. If a contingent fee cap is set below this
intersection, it is again not possible to screen low-quality attorneys. In cases where the contingent fee
cap is sufficiently low (which would be any cap if 𝜍 𝐿 < 𝜍 𝐻 ), the optimal contract may screen highquality attorneys rather than pool types. Because it is never optimal for a client to offer a contract that
allows both types to earn positive expected profits, there are two feasible candidates for the optimal
contract if contingent fee caps are set below the intersection: a separating contract which screens the
highs, and a pooling contract where the highs break even and the lows earn rents.

Let 𝑉𝐿 (𝑠, 𝑓, 𝑝𝐿 ) be the expected utility of a client who screens out the highs with a separating
contract: (𝑠 = 𝑠, 𝑓 = 𝑐 𝐿 − 𝑝𝐿 𝑠𝐷𝐻 − 1 − 𝑝𝐿 𝑠𝐷𝐿 ) .
𝑉𝐿 (𝑠, 𝑓, 𝑝𝐿 ) = 𝑝𝐿 𝑣 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐻 − 𝑓 + 1 − 𝑝𝐿 𝑣 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐿 − 𝑓

𝐴13

Let 𝑉𝐻𝐿 be the expected utility of a client who offers the least expensive pooling contract: 𝑠 = 𝑠, 𝑓 =

𝑐𝐻−𝑝𝐻𝑠𝐷𝐻−1−𝑝𝐻𝑠𝐷𝐿.
𝑉𝐻𝐿 𝑠, 𝑓, 𝑝𝐿 , 𝑝𝐻 , 𝑧
= 𝑧 𝑝𝐻 𝑣 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐻 − 𝑓 + 1 − 𝑝𝐻 𝑣 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐿 − 𝑓
+ 1−𝑧

𝑝𝐿 𝑣 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐻 − 𝑓 + 1 − 𝑝𝐿 𝑣 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐿 − 𝑓

(𝐴14)

If 𝑉𝐻𝐿 ≥ 𝑉𝐿 , the pooling contract will be offered. Otherwise, the separating contract will be offered.

Proposition 2: For z sufficiently close to 0, the separating contract will be offered.
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As the proportion of highs in the market approaches zero, the odds of hiring a high with a separating
contract also approaches zero. (A14) converges to 𝑝𝐿 𝑣 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐻 − 𝑓 + 1 − 𝑝𝐿 𝑣 1 − 𝑠 𝐷𝐿 − 𝑓 ,
which is (A13), the expected utility to a client who hires a low. Since the pooling contract has the same
contingent fee but a higher fixed fee than the separating contract, only the separating contract will be
offered. 36

Since we are interested in the average quality of attorneys, it is useful to know what parameters of the
market affect the choice between separating and pooling contracts, as pooling contracts allow lows to
serve clients. Without knowing the risk-preferences of clients, we cannot derive an exact expression for
the contingent fee cap that would cause clients to offer a separating contract instead of a pooling
contract. We can, however, determine how a change in a parameter of the market (proportion of types,
probability of winning, etc.) changes the cap that would cause clients to switch.
The risk-averse clients prefer contracts with greater contingent fees to those with the same
expected value but greater fixed fees. If they were risk-neutral, we could explicitly define a contingent
fee cap, 𝑠, at which a client would switch from offering a contract that pools types to one in which the
highs are screened. Since an increase in risk-aversion would lower the cap at which a client would switch
from pooling to separating, by solving as if the clients were risk-neutral, we can calculate a closed form
lower bound on the point at which a client would switch from pooling to separating.

Define 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐  , as the point at which a risk-neutral client would be indifferent between pooling and
screening. For any cap below 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐  , the separating contract is offered and high-quality attorneys are
36

For z sufficiently close to 1, the optimal contract depends on the characteristics of the attorneys and how riskaverse the client is. If the opportunity costs and probability of winning of the two types are such that a client would
choose the low if ability were observable, the separating contract would be offered. This could happen if a client
was sufficiently risk-averse or if the break-even contract for the high was sufficiently expensive.
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screened. The single-crossing of the iso-profit lines of attorneys ensure this point is unique for any set of
parameters.

𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐  =

(𝑐𝐻 − 𝑐𝐿 ) − 𝑧(𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿 ) 𝐷𝐻 − 𝐷𝐿
(1 − 𝑧)(𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿 ) 𝐷𝐻 − 𝐷𝐿

(𝐴15)

If 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐  < 0, clients will pool types for any cap if they are unable to screen the lows. Increasing the
opportunity cost of a high-quality attorney, the probability of a high-ability attorney winning, the high
damage award, or the proportion of highs in the market makes pooling more attractive and lowers the
switching point. Meanwhile, increasing the opportunity cost of a low-quality attorney, the probability of
a low-quality attorney winning, or the low damage award makes pooling less attractive and raises the
switching point.
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Appendix F: Instructions for Attorney Compensation Experiment

Introduction screen

Risk elicitation mechanism
141

Description of the case.

Description of the attorneys.

142

Description of the Contract.
This is from the Cap50 treatment. In the Cap25 and Cap100 treatments, the seventh line would read
“The Share may be any percentage between 0 and 25” or “… 0 and 100” respectively.

143

Description of the possible outcomes.

Description of the payoff to the client.
144

Description of how attorneys choose to accept or reject the contract.

Additional descriptions of the attorney decision.
145

Description of rounds.

Summary of game
146

Subjects create their own example problem for the next screen

Questions about expected profit that must be answered.
147

Practice round input screen (Cap50)

Results for the practice round.
148

Decision screen (Cap50 treatment)

Example results screen (project failed)
149

Results of risk-elicitation mechanism.

Questionnaire
150

Appendix G: Payoff Tables for Attorney Compensation Experiment

Type A attorney expected profit. Cap25 treatment.

Type B attorney expected profit. Cap25 treatment.
151

Type A attorney expected profit. Cap50 treatment.

Type B attorney expected profit. Cap50 treatment.
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Type A attorney expected profit. Cap100 treatment.

Type B attorney expected profit. Cap100 treatment.
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